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COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY: A POST-UNIVERSALIST
APPROACH
Lynn M. LoPuckit
ABSTRACr
This Article examines several competing systems proposed for
international cooperation in bankruptcy cases and concludes that a
cooperative form of territoriality would work best. Universalism,
the system that currently dominates the scholarship, diplomacy, and
jurisprudence of international bankruptcy, holds that the courts of
a bankrupt multinational company's "home country" should have
worldwide control and should apply the home country's law to the
core issues of the case. Universalism is unworkable, however, be-
cause it would require that countries permit foreign law and foreign
courts to govern wholly domestic relationships and because the
links that define the "home countries" of multinational companies
are so ephemeral and manipulable that the resulting system would
be unpredictable. Modified universalism, secondary bankruptcy,
and Rasmussen's corporate-charter contractualism, each of which
will be discussed below, are similarly flawed. Territoriality, a system
in which each country has jurisdiction over the portion of the mul-
tinational company within its borders, would provide the best foun-
dation for international cooperation. A system of cooperative
territoriality is optimal even though it potentially requires multiple
filing and prosecution of claims, cooperation among courts and ad-
ministrators with respect to particular reorganizations and liquida-
tions, and international agreements to control fleeing assets.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the scholarship,' diplomacy,2 and jurisprudence 3 of
multinational bankruptcy have operated within a universalist para-
1 See, e.g., Andr6 J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A
Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 314 (1998) (claiming that "those
who support the universality principle have a keener eye for the needs of practice"); U.
Drobnig, Cross-border Insolvency: General Problems, FORUM INTERNATIoNALE, Nov. 1993, at 9,
13 ("From the point of view of insolvency proceedings, the principle of universality is, of
course, the only adequate solution."); Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bank-
ruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 329, 338 (concluding that
"[u] niversality must be our goal"); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational
Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 26 (1997) (asserting that "[t]he preference of most, if
not all, academic commentators would be a meta-rule that the 'home' country of the mul-
tinational firm provide the single forum, and controlling law, for handling all transnational
bankruptcies"); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17
BROOK- J. INT'L L. 499, 515 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Avoidance] (stating that
"[u] niversality ... has long been accepted as the proper goal of international bankruptcy
law by leading writers"); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolven-
cies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 457, 461 (1991) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism] (referring to "nearly unanimous agreement across the
world that the financial difficulties of a multinational should be resolved in one central
forum, the 'universalist' principle"); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Andrew Guzmdn, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies 3-4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (endorsing universalism as economically efficient).
2 See, e.g., MODEL INT'L INSOLVENCY CO-OPERATION ACT cmt. (International Bar Ass'n,
Third draft 1988), reprinted in CuRRNT ISSUEs IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCYAND REORGANI-
ZATIONS app. 1, at 262 (E. Bruce Leonard & Christopher W. Besant eds., 1994) ("Insofar as
possible .... universality should be the guiding principle of all efforts toward international
insolvency cooperation, for it alone is truly compatible with the realisation of equal treat-
ment of all creditors, debtors, assets and liability, and the swift and effective administration
of the estate."); Berends, supra note 1, at 315 (observing that participants in an UNCITRAL
colloquium rated countries as being "in a good position" to the extent they had adopted a
universalist approach to cross-border insolvency); Ulrich Drobnig, Secured Credit in Interna-
tional Insolvency Proceedings, 33 TEx. INT'L LJ. 53, 66 (1998) (stating that "today almost all
countries embrace the principle of universality");Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priori-
ties, 33 TEx. INT'L LJ. 27, 39 (1998) (noting that "there is relatively little articulation ... at
international conferences of the reasons for favoring [modified territorialism] over some
form of universalism").
3 When U.S. courts have conceptualized the choice as between universalism and ter-
ritoriality, they invariably have opted for universalism or stood neutral. See, e.g., Overseas
Inns SA. P.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that
"[s]ome consider the 'universality' theory the modern trend in recognizing foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings" and referring to the trend as "a movement away from the old 'territo-
rial' approach"); In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 63-64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("This court
leans towards a 'universality' approach to international insolvency proceedings. Indeed,
the courts in the United States generally are increasingly supportive of the philosophy
underlying universality and are employing the doctrine in an ever growing number of cases
and circumstances." (footnote omitted)); Maxwell Communications Corp. v. Barclays (In re
Maxwell Communication Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he United
States in ancillary bankruptcy cases has embraced an approach to international insolvency
which is a modified form of universalism accepting the central premise of universalism
...."); Mary Elaine Knecht, Comment, The "Drapery of Illusion" of Section 304-What Lurks
Beneath: Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 287, 299 (1992) (pointing out that "the majority of U.S. courts claim to em-
ploy universality in dealing with foreign bankruptcy proceedings").
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digm.4 The core concept of universalism is that a single court should
have control over the assets of a bankrupt multinational firm.5 This
court should apply its nation's laws to decide between reorganization
and liquidation and to determine priorities among creditors.6 It
should control the administration of the assets of the debtor and
should make the distributions to creditors worldwide.7 The role of
other courts should be merely to render assistance to representatives
of the home court. Under universalism, one court plays the tune, and
everyone else dances.
During this period of universalism 8 there has been rapid global-
ization of business and sharp increases in both the number and the
size of multinational corporate bankruptcies. 9 Problems such as cross-
filing of claims, choice of law for avoiding powers, and sharp differ-
ences in national schemes of priority have become routine, and schol-
ars interested in the realities of multinational bankruptcy-
particularly Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook-have made tremen-
dous strides in identifying and understanding the complexities in-
volved.10 This Article argues that these scholars' successes have
4 This Article refers to universalism as a "paradigm" because it has defined "the legiti-
mate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practition-
ers." THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE oF ScIENT-FIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970).
5 See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman et al., Four ModelsforInternational Bankruptcy, 41 AM.J.
COMP. L. 573, 579 (1993) ("Universality... refers to the recognition given the decisions of
the single jurisdiction."); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 458 (referring
to "'universalism'" as "the resolution of the financial difficulties of 'a multinational com-
mercial enterprise in one proceeding"). Rasmussen uses the terms "substantive" and "pris-
tine" universalism to refer to a system in which the home court directly exercises
extraterritorialjurisdiction, and "procedural universalism" to refer to a system in which the
home court exercises extraterritoriality through recognition of its decisions by foreign
courts. See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 16-17.
6 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 16-17.
7 See Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
998- (1998) (describing "'universalist' philosophy" as contemplating that "one plenary
transnational proceeding completely govern[s] the administration of assets world-wide").
8 "Period of universalism" refers to the time in which universalist ideology almost
exclusively ruled the scholarship, diplomacy, and jurisprudence of multinational bank-
ruptcy. The international bankruptcy system actually operates with a chaotic blend of uni-
versalism and territoriality, in which "secondary bankruptcy," referred to by Westbrook as
"modified territoriality," Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 458, is probably
the dominant strain. See generally infra Part M (describing the system of secondary bank-
ruptcy, its claimed advantages, and its problems).
19 Few seem to doubt that such increases have occurred. See, e.g.,Jay Lawrence West-
brook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ. 563, 563 (1996) ("[T]he
reality for many bankruptcy lawyers and judges lies in the growing number of Canadian
and Mexican border cases .... More and more cases in United States bankruptcy courts
have an important foreign element .... ."). Depending on the definition employed, as
many as one third of all large bankruptcies of publicly-held companies may be interna-
tional. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1-2.
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undermined fatally the universalist paradigm in which they have been
working.
Attempting to reconcile their new understandings with the para-
digm, universalist scholars have proposed a steadily increasing
number of exceptions to universalist principles,"' a phenomenon rec-
ognized in the hard sciences as signaling an approaching paradigm-
shift.12 Two other trends also suggest such a shift. First, despite de-
cades of efforts, the major trading nations of the world still do not
have treaties or conventions among them.' 3 Second, although courts
and lawyers have continually given lip service to universalism in resolv-
ing multinational bankruptcy cases, they increasingly have found
nonuniversalist solutions to multinational problems.' 4 As a result,
11 For example, Drobnig advocates universalism, but adds that " [p]ersonally, I would
admit an exception for relationships which are strongly rooted locally, especially for secur-
ity rights in assets outside the country of the main proceeding and for labour contracts to
be performed abroad." Drobnig, supra note 1, at 18. Elsewhere, Drobnig describes four
competing approaches to the question of what law governs security interests in a universal-
ist system and notes that the question does not arise under territoriality. See Drobnig, supra
note 2, at 67-69. Three leading universalists acknowledge the unfairness of applying the
forum country's rules of priority to unsophisticated creditors in other countries and advo-
cate an exception for these creditors-without specifying who they are. See Trautman et
al., supra note 5, at 624 ("If cases should arise where the reasonable expectations of unso-
phisticated creditors... might suffer unfairly, there is no reason a special rule cannot be
applied in such cases."). Westbrook, an ardent universalist, finds himself advocating vari-
ous accommodations to territorialism because they "may have the additional virtue of in-
creasing the commercial pressures for universalist approaches." Westbrook, supra note 2,
at 43. Westbrook also suggests "the possibility of exempting from the universalist rule the
claims of consumers and tort victims or of exempting all claims below a certain monetary
amount." Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 489. With regard to choice of
law for the avoidance of transfers made in anticipation of bankruptcy (or "avoiding pow-
ers"), Westbrook admits the "pleasant symmetry of this analysis" under territorialism, but
rejects it in favor of a convoluted universalist solution "because of the serious disadvantages
and anomalies" of territorialism. Westbrook, Avoidance supra note 1, at 527. Aiwang advo-
cates bankruptcy universalism in the strongest terms, but proposes continuation of the
thoroughly territorial regime of debt collection in admiralty as an exception. See Melissa
K.S. Alwang, Note, Steering the Most Apprpriate Course Between Admiralty and Insolvency: Why
an International Insolvency Treaty Should Recognize the Primacy of Admiralty Law over Maritime
Assets, 64 FoDHAm L. REv. 2613, 2642-46 (1996).
12 See KUHN, supra note 4, at 67-68; see also id. at 68-76 (giving examples of such para-
digm-shifts).
13 See, e.g., Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice:
Is it Necessary? Is it Possible?, 27 INT'L LAw. 881, 897 (1993) (referring to "the dearth of
bankruptcy treaties and the failure of recent efforts in this area"); Anne Nielsen et al., The
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles To Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolven-
cies, 70 AM. BANK- L.J. 533, 534 (1996) ("Only a handful of international bankruptcy trea-
ties espousing a universality-based theory have been successful, and, in these cases, the
parties to the treaties usually have had close territorial ties and similar legal, economic, and
cultural traditions."). But see Gaa, supra, at 883 n.6 (noting the existence of "the Scandina-
vian Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, and [the exis-
tence of] the Bustamonte Code, which has been ratified by 15 Latin American states").
14 See, e.g., Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International, SA, 4 All E.R. 796, 796
(Ch. 1996) (holding that although the English liquidation was "ancillary" to the principal
liquidation in Luxembourg, the English courts should apply the English rule of setoff in
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universalists have begun to describe their philosophy as an unobtain-
able ideal 15 and to talk of second-best solutions16-though still within
the universalist paradigm.17
Territoriality is the antithesis of universalism. In a territorial re-
gime, each country would have jurisdiction over the portion of the
bankrupt multinational firm within its borders. In each case, each
country's bankruptcy court would decide whether to participate in a
transnational effort at reorganization or liquidation or to conduct a
local reorganization or liquidation according to local law. The bank-
ruptcy literature generally disparages territoriality18 and sometimes
favor of English creditors); MIKE SiGAL ET AL., THE LAW AND PRACrICE OF INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCIES, INCLUDING A DRAFr CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CONCORDAT 95 (1994) (es-
pousing universalism while setting forth rules for the type of secondary bankruptcy system
that Westbrook has referred to as "modified territorialism"); Knecht, supra note 3, at 299
(arguing that "while the majority of U.S. courts claim to employ universality in dealing with
foreign bankruptcy proceedings, the majority of cases reveal that the courts only apply
universality when they have assurance that foreign law will treat U.S. creditors virtually the
same way that filing in the United States would have").
15 See, e.g., Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27
INT'L LAW. 429, 437 (1993) (describing the first failed proposal for a European Union
bankruptcy treaty in the early 1980s as "overambitious" because it essentially employed a
universalist approach); Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the
Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307, 322 (1987) (stating that "[ideally,
there would be an international unity of bankruptcy law, so that creditors, debtors, and
courts everywhere could respond universally and equitably to the bankruptcy of a multina-
tional debtor," but noting that this "ideal must be tempered by the practical"); Nielsen et
al., supra note 13, at 549 ("[I]n most cases it is preferable to have one worldwide main
insolvency proceeding, with one or more supporting insolvency proceedings. This cannot
be assured, however, as there is no treaty among nations requiring this result. .. .");
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that "[tihe question that faces U.S. policymakers is
whether and to what extent to adapt U.S. doctrine to the realities of a world of modified
territorialism despite the U.S. conviction that modified universalism is a superior long-term
solution"); Alwang, supra note 11, at 2616 ("Insolvency experts agree that a treaty that
creates a truly universal bankruptcy system is not feasible . . ").
16 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 2, at 43 ("It may be that we must shape our reforms
in international insolvency to a version of modified territorialism for the present if they are
to work efficiently and fairly in the world as it is.").
17 See id. (noting that Westbrook remains "deeply committed to the idea of universal-
ism in insolvency matters").
18 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the "'territorial approach' to bank-
ruptcy law has been criticized for a number of years," leading to "modest reforms"); Traut-
man et al., supra note 5, at 575 (referring to the "tyranny of territoriality"); Lore Unt,
International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, Institutionalism, and
TransnationalLegalDialogue, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1037, 1040 (1997) (describing terri-
torialism as "the non-coordination of international insolvency proceedings"); Westbrook,
supra note 2, at 39 ("[T]here is relatively little articulation in the literature or even in
discussions at international conferences of the reasons for favoring [modified territorial-
ity] over some form of universalism. Perhaps the explanation for this silence is that some
of the reasons for territorialism are unfashionable and unflattering."); James Garrett Van
Osdell, Note, The Transnational Insolvency Dilemma: Congress Should Emphasize Comity of Na-
tions, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1998) ("[T~he territoriality approach... has done little to
encourage countries to work toward harmonizing inconsistent domestic bankruptcy
laws.").
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equates it with a lack of cooperation between countries. 19 Perhaps
because of this history, territoriality has failed to emerge as an alterna-
tive to universalism as a foundation for ordering the international
bankruptcy regime.
Building on the work of Westbrook and other universalist schol-
ars and using a systems methodology, this Article explores the possibil-
ity of an international bankruptcy regime grounded in territoriality.
The systems approach holds that, because the best resolution of any
particular issue of system design depends on how other issues are re-
solved, the relevant comparison is among comprehensive solutions
rather than among resolutions of particular issues.20 Accordingly, this
Article compares five possible systems for international cooperation in
business bankruptcy cases. Part I examines universalism and rejects it
as unworkable. Part II critiques modified universalism, the approach
formally adopted by the United States in Bankruptcy Code § 304.21
Part III examines secondary bankruptcy, the system that de facto
dominates international cooperation in bankruptcy cases throughout
most of the world. Part IV considers a system recently proposed by
Professor Robert K Rasmussen in which each firm could select a
bankruptcy regime in its articles of incorporation. Part V proposes
what I call "cooperative territoriality"-a system for international co-
operation in bankruptcy cases grounded in territoriality. This Article
concludes that cooperative territoriality is likely to produce the best
results.
This Article uses the ability of the system to achieve an accepted
set of goals as the criteria for system comparison. To assure the rele-
vance of this analysis to a broad audience, this Article assumes that the
goals of the international bankruptcy system are those already identi-
fied by universalist scholars.22 First, the system should operate pre-
19 See, e.g., Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Claims and Priorities in Ancil-
lary Proceedings Under Section 304, 17 BRooL J. INT'L L. 477, 481 (1991) (asserting that
"[t]eritoriality... sacrifices international cooperation"); Trautman et al., supra note 5, at
574-75 ("[Territoriality] leads... to a grand international free-for-all, with each country
claiming plenary power over assets located there and paying no attention to what other
countries may say .... ."); Unt, supra note 18, at 1040 (referring to territorialism as "the
inverse of multinational cooperation"); Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 1, at 514 (assert-
ing that the justification for territorialism "seems to be a sigh of despair: bankruptcy is
simply too complicated for international cooperation to work").
20 See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and
Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267, 340-42
(1994) (describing how U.S. and Canadian reorganization systems reach functional equiva-
lence through different means). See generally, Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to
Law, 82 CORNEL. L. REv. 479 (1997) (arguing that the systems approach is the most prom-
ising and realistic methodology for the analysis of law-related problems).
21 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
22 This Article makes this assumption for two reasons. First, my differences with uni-
versalist scholars regarding the system's goals for international cooperation are minimal.
Second, by accepting their goals and demonstrating that cooperative territoriality better
702 [Vol. 84:696
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
dictably so that lenders can price credit accurately.23  Second, the
system should maximize the values of bankruptcy estates in liquida-
tions and facilitate reorganizations24 consistent with the policies of the
countries involved. Third, the system should minimize expenses and
delays for participants. 25 Fourth, the system should minimize conflicts
among the nations involved.2 6 Fifth, writers posit that distributions
should be equitable, by which they usually mean pro rata among un-
secured creditors.27 In economic terms, all but the last goal are sub-
sumed in the more general goal of "economic efficiency. '28
achieves them, this Article addresses their arguments directly. See LoPucki, supra note 20,
at 502-03 (noting that an analysis based on normative attribution of goals is useful only to
those who agree with the attribution).
23 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 17 (asserting that "universalism provides credi-
tors with a clear set of rules, which allows them to price their loans more accurately");
Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 466 (asserting that the greater predict-
ability of universalism "would significantly reduce the costs of borrowing and other credit
for multinationals"); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 39 ("The great benefits of universalism
are predictability and the consequent vindication of expectations, which can be achieved
only by applying home-country rules."); Bebchuk & Guzmkn, supra note 1, at 2 & n.10
(arguing that lenders can better predict their rights on default in a universalist system).
24 See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCC(, 8 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 487, 504 (1992) ("If U.S. or other country assets of failed foreign banks are not fully
consolidated in home-country foreign insolvency proceedings ... the ability of a foreign
receiver to reorganize a failed bank will be severely limited."); Westbrook, Theory and Prag-
matism, supra note 1, at 465 (asserting that under universalism "the preservation of going
concern values and the maximizing of liquidation values by integrated sales will likely in-
crease returns to creditors greatly"); Alwang, supra note 11, at 2624 (stating that
"[u]niversality would maximize returns to creditors" and that "[flrom both the debtor's
and creditor's viewpoints, reorganization works best if a single forum can protect all of a
debtor's assets").
25 See, e.g., Drobnig, supra note 1, at 12 ("Territoriality demands that as many insol-
vency proceedings must be opened, conducted and closed as there are countries in which
assets of the insolvent debtor are located .... Plurality of proceedings is apt to multiply
costs and expenses, for the courts as well as for the parties."). Universalists sometimes cite
finality of result as an independent goal. See, e.g., Gaa, supra note 13, at 885. Finality is not,
however, an end in itself, but merely a means of minimizing cost and delay and avoiding
conflict among the nations involved.
26 See, e.g., Gaa, supra note 13, at 884-85 (citing predictability, efficiency, equity, and
finality as the necessary means of achieving international insolvency and bankruptcy coop-
eration); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Comment: A More Optimistic View of Cross-Border Insolvency,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 947, 947 (1994) (stressing the importance of international cooperation).
27 See, e.g., Drobnig, supra note 2, at 66 (referring to "equal and optimal satisfaction of
all creditors" as "the main purpose" of insolvency proceedings); Scott, supra note 24 at 504
("The failure to consolidate may also result in the inability of non-U.S. creditors to obtain
the same pro rata share of all of the bank's assets that they would have obtained if the
assets were consolidated."); Alwang, supra note 11, at 2623 (referring to "equal treatment
of creditors" as a "benefit[ ]" of universalism). But see Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism,
supra note 1, at 466 (describing and criticizing "equality of distribution" as an argument in
favor of universalism).
28 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 4 (describing his approach as "[ b] eginning with the
assumption that the overall goal of bankruptcy law, at least in the corporate setting, should
be efficiency").
1999]
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This Article's systems analysis reveals two key flaws that render
universalism unworkable. First, universalism necessarily gives foreign
law and foreign courts ultimate power over wholly domestic relation-
ships, thus enabling the foreign country to export its social and eco-
nomic policies through its bankruptcy administration. Second, the
"home countries" of multinational companies are so ephemeral, and
forum shopping renders them so manipulable, that the resulting sys-
tem would be unpredictable. By contrast, cooperative territoriality re-
lies on traditional principles of international cooperation, including
comity, to thwart the export of social and economic policies. Cooper-
ative territoriality requires courts to locate assets rather than identify
debtor home countries. Although cooperative territoriality remains
vulnerable to forum shopping through the movement of assets, the
problem is more easily managed than the types of shopping likely to
plague competing systems, making cooperative territoriality more pre-
dictable ex ante.
I
UNIVERSALISM
A. The System
As stated above, "universalism" refers to a system in which a single
bankruptcy court controls the administration of the debtor's assets
and makes the distributions to creditors worldwide.2 9 That single
bankruptcy court may be the court of the country designated in the
debtor's articles of incorporation, 0 the court of the country in which
the debtor is incorporated,31 the court of the country in which the
debtor has its headquarters, 32 or the court of the country in which the
debtor has the bulk of its assets or operations. 33 However, most uni-
versalists specify the court of the "home country" or the "center of the
debtor's interests" as the proper forum. 3 4 While they acknowledge
the vagueness of their terminology, they assert that the home country
29 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 32-36 (arguing for the enforcement of provi-
sions in firm's corporate charters that specify the country whose laws would apply to the
firm's bankruptcy).
31 See id. at 35 n.162 (proposing that countries require firms to file for bankruptcy in
the jurisdictions in which they are incorporated, as an alternative to his proposal that firms
be able to select the jurisdiction in their articles of incorporation).
32 See Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 580 (stating that in the "'ideal' arrangement,"
the forum should be at the "principal place of business of the enterprise").
33 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 24, at 492 (suggesting that for international banks, the
home country should be the country of principal operations).
34 See, e.g., Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 581 (stating that the common market
convention specified the "'centre of administration of the debtor'" as the place having the
exclusive right to adjudicate).
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of the vast majority of multinational debtors will not be subject to seri-
ous dispute.35
In administering the bankruptcy, the home country forum will
apply its own law to the central issues of priority among creditors,36 to
the terms upon which debtors will be permitted to reorganize, 37 and
to the avoidance of prebankruptcy transfers as preferences, fraudulent
transfers, or the like.38 Under its own choice of law rules, the home
country will apply the law of other countries when appropriate. For
example, the home country court probably will test the validity and
perfection of a security interest under the law of the country where
the security interest was created and perfected.3 9
Under a pure form of universalism sometimes referred to as
"unity," the home country court would have jurisdiction over all of the
debtor's assets, wherever located, and the sheriffs, marshals, or other
law enforcement officers of other countries would enforce that court's
orders.40 Under the more practical version of universalism, the repre-
sentative of the estate, appointed by the court of the home country,
would petition a court in the local country for assistance in enforce-
ment. The local court then would be obligated to render that assist-
35 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 12 ("In most situations, it will be clear which
country is the home of the debtor."); Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 582 ("[A]rguments
in favor of precision [in specifying the debtor's home country] not only ignore reality but
fail to recognize that in the vast majority of cases the test will prove workable."); id. at 612
("[I]n practice the courts have been able to proceed on the basis of whether the enterprise
is predominantly an American or foreign one"); Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 1, at 529
("Although circumstances will exist in which determination of the home-country of a cor-
poration will be difficult, it will usually be self-evident.").
36 See, e.g., Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 580 (arguing that under universalism, a
court should use the law of the forum to determine issues of "whether and to what extent a
creditor's interest is a secured interest" and of "priorities among creditors"); Westbrook,
supra note 2, at 39 ("[A] purely universalist court will always choose home-country law for
priorities.").
37 See, e.g., Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 482 (noting the diffi-
culty of achieving universalism in the context of reorganization because the laws of poten-
tial home countries are so different).
38 See Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 580; Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 1, at 528-
29 (arguing that the court should apply the avoiding rules of the home country in a system
of modified universalism).
39 See Roy Goode, Security in Cross-Border Transactions, 33 TEx. INT'L LJ. 47, 51 (1998)
("The general conflict of laws principle is that, as a starting position, security rights validly
created under the applicable law (typically the ex rei sitae) will be recognized [in multina-
tional bankruptcy proceedings]."); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 29 & n.14 (explaining that
as to secured claims "it is generally assumed that the law of the situs of the collateral is most
often chosen for all purposes" and noting that recent "discussions of choice of law for
secured claims really focused on the possibility of different choices of law for different
issues relating to secured claims"). But see Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 584 (noting that
the common market convention would decide "the rules for determining the validity of
secured interests vis-4-vis other creditors" by the law of the single forum).
40 SeeWestbrook, supra note 2, at 28 n.4 (noting that "'unity' ... means that one court
administers all assets, but that notion is so far from contemporary reality that it is not really
part of the working hypothesis of present scholars").
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ance. Because the current scholarly agenda includes only the
practical form of universalism, 41 this Article evaluates only that form.
Universalism gives all creditors the right to file claims and share
in distributions from the bankruptcy estate. Additionally, Westbrook
advocates a rule of cross-priority, that is, making priorities specified
under the law of the forum available to foreign as well as domestic
creditors.42 For example, in the Mexican bankruptcy of a Mexican
company, an employee who worked for the company in the United
States would be entitled to the priority accorded wages under Mexican
bankruptcy law, not the priority accorded wages under U.S. bank-
ruptcy law.
Writers describing universalism nearly always assume that the
debtor is a single corporation conducting an independent business.43
Thus, they do not address the common situation in which the debtor
is a corporate group. Part I.C discusses the problem of corporate
groups.
To illustrate the operation of a universalist system, assume that
the United States is the home country of a debtor with worldwide op-
erations. The debtor would file for bankruptcy in the United States.
The U.S. court would control the assets of the debtor worldwide, de-
termine whether to reorganize or liquidate the company based on
U.S. law, and distribute the assets of the company among creditors
and shareholders based on their priorities under U.S. law. The courts
of other countries would be expected to render assistance to the U.S.
court.
B. Claimed Advantages
According to proponents, universalism offers five advantages.
First, a universalist system will realize larger proceeds from the liquida-
tion of multinational companies because a single representative will
have the authority to sell all of the assets.44 This representative can
sell them either together or separately, whichever will bring the
41 See id.
42 See id. at 38 ("[A] home-country court.., should grant national treatment, or cross-
priority, to all claims falling within a defined priority category... without regard to nation-
ality, residence, or other indicia of 'foreignness' .... "). For further discussion of West-
brook's proposal, see infra Part V.A.2.
43 For articles endorsing universalism without considering the problem of corporate
groups, see Rasmussen, supra note 1; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 489
(referring to the "treatment of groups of companies" as an "important issue[ ] unad-
dressed in this paper"); Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 1.
44 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 18 ("[A] single proceeding will allow the seller
to package the assets in a way that maximizes their value."); Westbrook, Theory and Pragma-
tism, supra note 1, at 465 (asserting that "maximizing... liquidation values by integrated
sales [under a universalist system] will likely increase returns to creditors greatly"); Alwang,
supra note 11, at 2624 (arguing that "[u]niversality would maximize returns to creditors").
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higher price. Thus, universalism assumes that situations frequently
arise in which the sale of worldwide operations as a unit will bring a
substantially higher price than separate sales of assets in the various
countries.
Second, the reorganization of a viable multinational firm often
requires the coordinated use of assets located in different countries.45
Proponents of universalism argue that unless a single court adminis-
ters those assets, reorganization will not be possible, and the going
concern value of the firm will be lost.4 6 The conventional wisdom re-
garding reorganization within the United States-that a single court
should have jurisdiction over all of the debtor's assets nationwide so
that a single representative can coordinate their use-buttresses this
argument.47 Professor Westbrook adds an additional twist. He argues
that, without universalism, creditors would have distorted incentives
when choosing between reorganization and liquidation. 48 This distor-
tion would occur because the creditors in countries with high asset-to-
claim ratios would have less incentive to incur the risks of reorganiza-
tion than creditors in countries with low asset-to-claim ratios.49 West-
brook's argument incorrectly assumes, however, that creditors, rather
than estate representatives, control the decision to reorganize or
liquidate.50
Third, proponents of universalism argue that the collection and
distribution of assets through a single forum will result in lower costs
than collection and distribution through multiple fora.51 This argu-
45 See, e.g., Alwang, supra note 11, at 2625 (asserting that "[rjeorganization is unlikely
if foreign creditors can attach, in multiple countries, the assets necessary for the debtor to
continue operating").
46 SeeWestbrook, They and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 465 (asserting that "the pres-
ervation of going concern values... will likely increase returns to creditors greatly"); Al-
wang, supra note 11, at 2624 (arguing that "[f]rom both the debtor's and creditor's
viewpoints, reorganization works best if a single forum can protect all of a debtor's assets").
47 For example, the Second Circuit has noted:
The automatic stay.., is designed to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled
scramble for the debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings
in different courts. The stay insures that the debtor's affairs will be central-
ized, initially, in a single forum in order to prevent conflicting judgments
from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the creditors' inter-
ests with one another.
Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Underwood v. Hilliard (In re Rimsat, Ltd.), 98 F.Sd 956, 961-62 (1996) ("The efficacy of the
bankruptcy proceeding depends on the court's ability to control and marshal the assets of
the debtor wherever located. .. ").
48 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 465.
49 See id.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 291-93.
51 Rasmussen, for example, wrote that
[e]ven if one propounds a universal regime which entails the use of ancil-
lary courts in countries other than the debtor's home jurisdiction, there will
still be administrative savings. While parties may have to hire counsel to
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ment is strongest with regard to distributions. In a universalist re-
gime, only a single set of distributions would be necessary. In other
regimes, two or more courts would make distributions to creditors.
Fourth, proponents argue that a universal system will be more
predictable ex ante to lenders contemplating loans to multinational
debtors or debtors who in the future might become multinational.52
For example, Westbrook argues that "one body of law must be applied
to the maximum extent if relative default priorities are to be pre-
dicted accurately. The home-country law is the one law that can be
most reliably predicted in advance."53 Professors Lucian Bebchuk and
Andrew Guzm5.n make a variant of this argument.54 They use eco-
nomic analysis to demonstrate that, in a purely universal regime, lend-
ers invest based only on the expected return of the project,55 while in
a partly or fully territorial regime, lenders' incentives will be skewed to
investment where the debtor's asset-to-debt ratio is the best.5 6
Finally, proponents argue that universalism results in fairer distri-
butions among creditors.57 This argument begins from the premise
that within any class of creditors, the fairest basis for distribution is
pro rata. A universalist regime most easily can achieve a pro rata dis-
tribution because a single court makes the distribution to all members
of the class simultaneously. Universalist scholars generally assert that
regimes which permit two or more fora to make distributions to the
creditors of a single multinational debtor must find a way to adjust
later distributions to take account of inequalities in earlier
distributions.58
represent them in both the main and ancillary proceedings, the amount of
litigation handled by the ancillary proceedings will be less than it currently
is under the territorial system.
Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 18; see Bebchuk & Guzmfn, supra note 1, at 2.
52 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 466 (discussing the benefits
of increased predictability).
53 Id. at 469.
54 See Bebchuk & Guzmfn, supra note 1.
55 See id. at 18-19.
56 See id. at 19-24. The argument fails to account for debtors' ability to borrow in one
country and deploy the funds in another. To illustrate, assume that in a territorial regime,
the debtor seeks to borrow money for a project in country A, but the debtor's asset-to-debt
ratio is better in country B. The simple solution is for the debtor to borrow the money in
country B and invest it in the project in country A. See, e.g., Ar.AN C. SHAPIRo, MULTINA-
TIONAL FINANcIAL MANAGEMENT 767-69 (5th ed. 1996) (describing this as the "cost-minimiz-
ing" approach to multinational finance and describing the financing of Nestl6 as an
example of the approach).
57 See Drobnig, supra note 2, at 66 (asserting that an international bankruptcy pro-
ceeding "can only achieve its main purpose of equal and optimal satisfaction of all credi-
tors if all assets of the debtor are covered by the proceeding"). But see Westbrook, Theory
and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 466 (disputing that "[a] universalist system would be far
more fair, and produce more equality of distribution among creditors").
58 However, the claim is only partly true. See infra text accompanying note 246.
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C. Problems
The problems with universalism are overwhelming. The most im-
portant problems are that (1) in a universalist system, foreign law and
courts govern wholly domestic relationships, confusing domestic mar-
kets; (2) the home country standard is indeterminate in many cases;
(3) no workable rule can be devised for determining the extent to
which the home country is to have jurisdiction over corporate groups;
and (4) the home country standard is vulnerable to strategic
manipulation.
1. Foreign Law and Courts Governing Domestic Relationships
In a universalist system, the forum country applies its own laws
and judicial philosophy regarding core bankruptcy issues-the rela-
tive priorities of creditors in a distribution, the choice between reor-
ganization and liquidation, and the avoidance of prepetition transfers.
Yet the laws of various countries differ widely in resolving these is-
sues.59 For example, in some countries, including the United States,
tort claims share pro rata with commercial claims.60 In other coun-
tries, tort claims are subordinated to commercial claims. 61 In still
other countries, tort claims are not recognized at all unless they can
be framed in contract.62 Under U.S. law, judgment lien creditors are
secured creditors up to the value of their collateral, but under Spanish
law, they are general unsecured creditors. 63 Most countries give prior-
ity to their own taxes,64 but refuse even to enforce the taxes of other
countries unless a treaty requires it.65 Equitable subordination plays a
59 For an excellent comparison of the insolvency priority rules of various countries,
see PHImP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY §§ 1-14 to -56, at 10-31
(1995).
60 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2) (1994) (assigning priority to unsecured claims with-
out regard to whether they arose in contract or tort).
61 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRuPTcy LAW 49 (Preliminary
Draft No. 3, Aug. 21, 1997).
62 See WOOD, supra note 59, §1-56, at 30-31. Unliquidated claims are similarly denied
recognition in some systems. See In re Papeleras Reunidas, SA, 92 B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that "Spanish law recognizes only 'constitutive,' or liquidated, un-
disputed claims" in suspension of payments proceedings).
63 See, e.g., In re Papeleras Reunidas, SA_, 92 B.R. at 591 ("Spanish law classifies judg-
ment lien creditors as general unsecured creditors while United States law generally classi-
fies such lien creditors as secured creditors up to the value of the properties to which the
liens attach . . ").
64 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
65 Generally the United States does not enforce foreign tax claims. See NATIoNAL
BANx. REv. COMM'N, BAMRup'rc. ThE NEXT Twm'= YEARs 364-65 (1997) (recom-
mending that development of the law in this area be left to treaty negotiators and courts);
WOOD, supra note 59, § 1-54, at 30 ("Manyjurisdictions do not permit the claims of foreign
revenue authorities or foreign penal demands."); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 37-38 (dis-
cussing the disallowance of foreign government tax claims in insolvency proceedings).
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key role in U.S. priorities, but it is not recognized in Australia. 66 Simi-
larly, under Canadian law, creditors secured by different collateral can
be classified together, and the majority can outvote the minority67-a
concept that is appalling to the American bankruptcy community. Fi-
nally, Germany will recognize a security interest in an automobile if
the debtor granted the interest in France and then moved the car to
Germany, but France will not recognize a security interest in the recip-
rocal situation-the debtor granted the interest in Germany and then
moved the car to France. 68
The priority problem cannot be resolved merely by making a few
simple adjustments. Each nation's priority scheme is an integrated
system in which each class of creditors' priority depends both on the
likelihood that other classes of debt will arise and on the preferences
given to them. To illustrate, in Mexico, generous legal entitlements
ensure that bankrupt firms are likely to owe substantial amounts to
employees for wages, benefits, and potential severance pay.69 Mexi-
can law requires that these employment claims be paid prior to the
claims of other unsecured creditors and most secured creditors,70
making employees the most likely "residual owners" of the bankrupt
firm. 71 By contrast, in the United States, employment claims are likely
to be small. Statutes limit their priority to $4,000 per employee and
require the claimed wage to be earned within ninety days before the
date of the filing of the petition.72 In addition, employment claims
are subordinated to the claims of secured creditors73 (including those
66 See, e.g., Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star (In re KKL (Kanga-
roo Line) Pty Ltd.), 102 B.R. 373, 379 (D.NJ. 1988) (refusing to recognize an Australian
insolvency proceeding because, among other things, Australia did not recognize the doc-
trine of equitable subordination). Equitable subordination has been referred to as "almost
an exclusively US doctrine." WOOD, supra note 59, § 1-49, at 28.
67 See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 20, at 323.
68 See Drobnig, supra note 2, at 63-64.
69 See INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRurrcY LAW, supra note 61, at 47 &
n.160.
70 See id.
71 The "residual owner" is the class of investor-whether creditor or owner-that
stands to gain or lose from marginal changes in the value of the business. Bankruptcy
systems tend to grant control over the debtor and the case to the residual owners. See, e.g.,
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 771-76 (1993). A majority of
countries give secured creditors priority over wage claims. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OF-
FICE, THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS' CLAIMS IN THE EVENT OF THE EMPLOYER'S INSOLVENCY
27-28 (Edward Yemin & Arturo S. Bronstein eds., 1991). But a substantial minority, like
Mexico, give priority to wage claims over secured creditors. See id. at 29-30 (naming
France, Spain, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Benin, Chad, C6te d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Philippines as such countries).
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (3) (1994).
73 See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRuPTcY § 7-10, at 461 (1992) (giving an over-
view of the U.S. bankruptcy claims hierarchy).
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unsecured due to a lack of adequate protection 74), administrative ex-
penses,75 and postpetition lending.7 6 As a result, employment claim-
ants seldom have much power in U.S. bankruptcy cases. Yet in a
universalist system, the priority of Mexican workers' employment
claims against a U.S. firm operating in Mexico would be determined
by U.S. rules of priority-much to the disappointment of the affected
Mexican workers.
Some scholars have made broad assertions that creditors contract
with reference to the bankruptcy laws of the debtor's home country.77
Even if such contracting were practical, however, it would still create a
stiflingly complex domestic interface for the international bankruptcy
system.78 Presumably, sellers would adjust the prices of all goods and
services sold on credit in the domestic economy to reflect the bank-
ruptcy priority of the seller under the law of the debtor's home coun-
try. Workers who performed the same jobs in the same industry in the
same city would be paid varying amounts, depending on the national-
ity of the firm for which they worked. Suppliers would determine the
home countries of firms operating domestically, would calculate their
likelihood of recovery under the bankruptcy laws of those countries,
and would adjust credit terms accordingly. Workers and suppliers
also would want to factor in the possibility that the financial problems
of their debtor would be resolved under nonbankruptcy law, which
would remain territorial.7 9
As a practical matter, the Mexican employee, the Mexican trade
creditor, and even their U.S. counterparts are unlikely to know
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
75 See id. §507(a) (1).
76 See id. § 364.
77 See, e.g., Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 618 (urging adoption of "principal place
of business" as the test of home country because "debtor[s] and... creditor[s] shape their
expectations" based on that country's rules). Although this statement is probably true for
some relatively sophisticated lenders, most lenders probably have non-country specific ex-
pectations based on their past experience with nonpaying debtors. Employees are likely to
base their expectations on experience with debtors in the country where the employees are
located. Recognizing this source of creditor expectations, later in the same article, Traut-
man, Westbrook, and Gaillard advocate a special rule for "unsophisticated creditors." Id. at
624.
78 See, e.g., id. at 584 ("Giving effect to unified, home-country rules has costs. The
transactional cost is that every party dealing in Belgian land with a German party must
consider the possible effects of German bankruptcy law.").
79 Even within a single country, the possibility that the financial problems of a debtor
might be resolved differently under bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law has proven diffi-
cult to control. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in
Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CoRNLL L. REv. 1483, 1485-88 (1997) (describ-
ing the debate between Professors Douglas G. Baird and Elizabeth Warren over how to
deal with the problem). The difference between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law gen-
erates strategic activity-a sign that the legal system in question is flawed. See id. at'1498-
1507.
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enough about foreign insolvency laws to adjust to them. Any trade
creditor that sells its products to large numbers of customers is selling
to debtors from a variety of home countries-even if all of the sales
and deliveries are made domestically. Even in a universalist regime, a
trade creditor rarely would find it cost-effective to discover the home
countries of its corporate customers, let alone to evaluate the insol-
vency regimes of those countries and to adjust the credit terms ac-
cordingly.80  The likelihood of the insolvency of any particular
customer would be too small. In practice, universalism would be un-
predictable to all but the largest creditors of multinational companies.
Westbrook correctly states that "[s]imilar laws about distributions,
avoidance, and the like are not in principle necessary to the accept-
ance of universalism, but in practice similarity is very important' s and
that "[a] general invitation to [universalist] cooperation issued to all
countries, regardless of similarity of laws, may not be realistic."8 2
The choice between reorganization and liquidation provides an-
other example of the difficulty creditors would face in reaping bene-
fits from the asserted predictability of a universalist system. U.S. law
strongly favors the reorganization of business debtors. To achieve re-
organization, U.S. law leaves the debtor in control of the business and
allows the debtor to risk the expectancy of the unsecured creditors in
any reasonable attempt at reorganization.8 3 By contrast, the laws of
most other countries put a representative of the unsecured creditors
in charge of the reorganization attempt.8 4 Foreign creditors who
fixed the terms of their lending based on expectations regarding local
insolvency proceedings would be unpleasantly surprised at their fate
under U.S. procedures.
In a universalist system, not only would foreign law apply to rela-
tionships created in wholly domestic transactions, but also foreign
bankruptcy courts would have jurisdiction to adjudicate many aspects
of those relationships. A Mexican worker in a Mexican factory owned
by a company whose home country was the United States would file
and perhaps litigate his or her claim in a U.S. bankruptcy court. The
80 Westbrook admits the difficulty. See Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 1, at 534
("There would be real difficulty in applying Hong Kong preference law to a small United
States supplier who was dealing with a local [United States] branch of a Hong Kong debtor
in a transaction that was in every way local except for the nationality of the debtor.").
Westbrook and others, however, offer no solution aside from the vague proposal of an
exception for "unsophisticated creditors." See Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 624.
81 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 468.
82 Id. at 469.
83 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 71, at 701-04 (contrasting the treatment of se-
cured creditors, who are entitled to adequate protection against the loss of their collateral,
with the treatment of unsecured creditors, who are not).
84 SeeWooD, supra note 59, § 18-9, at 302 ("Except in the United States, management
is usually displaced in favour of an insolvency representative.").
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Chinese trade creditor that sold to a U.S. company operating in China
would do the same. Creditors would be at a severe disadvantage in
such litigation. First, they would have to hire lawyers in a foreign
country and communicate with them at a distance. Second, the likeli-
hood of prejudice against them in the debtor's home country would
be high. 5 Legal realists understand that such prejudices translate
into adverse decisions.8 6
2. Indeterminacy of the "Home Country" Standard
In a universalist system, the determination that one country
rather than another is the debtor's home country is crucial. First, as
discussed above, the core bankruptcy rules and philosophy of the
home country govern the liquidation or reorganization of the debtor
worldwide. Second, the liquidation or reorganization of a large com-
pany can generate hundreds of millions of dollars in professional
fees.87 In a universalist system, most of these fees will go to profession-
als in the home country.
Universalists concede that it is difficult to state a precise rule for
determining a debtor's home country.8 They take refuge, however,
in the belief that the identity of the home country will be obvious in
the large majority of cases. The debtor usually will have its headquar-
ters and most of its assets in the country in which it is incorporated.8 9
This answer, however, is hardly adequate. First, even accepting the
factual assertion as correct, the home countries of a substantial
number of companies remain in doubt. Such companies include, for
example, those involved in the two most prominent international
bankruptcy cases to date, Maxwell Communication Corporation and
BCCI.
85 See, e.g., Alwang, supra note 11, at 2627 ("A nation's courts favor creditors within
that nation's borders."). But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in
American Courts, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1120, 1122, 1133-35 (1996) (demonstrating empirically
that foreigners fare well in adjudicated cases in the United States and speculating that this
success occurs because they frequently settle cases on the expectation that prejudice
against them will be greater than it actually is).
86 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90
Nw. U. L. Rxv. 1498, 1510-21 (1996) (explaining the mechanisms by which written law
yields to the oral traditions of lawyers).
87 See, e.g., Joe Ortiz, BCCI Creditors To Get $2.65 Billion Payment Tuesday, REUTER EuRo.
Bus. REP., Dec. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories ("The English liquidators
of BCCI, Deloite & Touche ... have been paid a massive $200 million in fees.").
88 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Developments in Transnational Bankruptcy, 39 ST.
Louis U. LJ. 745, 752 n.37 (1995) (acknowledging that negotiations for a U.S.-Canadian
bankruptcy treaty "foundered on a dispute over the test for 'home country'").
89 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 12 ("In most situations, it will be dear which coun-
try is the home of the debtor."); Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 581, 582 (arguing that the
"'centre of administration of the debtor'" test "in the vast majority of cases ... will prove
workable").
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Maxwell had its headquarters in the United Kingdom and the
bulk of its assets in the United States. 90 BCCI was incorporated in
Luxembourg,91 spread its assets throughout the world,92 and retained
only a "brass plate" headquarters in Luxembourg,93 where its bank-
ruptcy proceeded. Shortly before filing bankruptcy, BCCI moved its
operational headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi.94
When the country of incorporation, the country of headquarters,
and the country with the largest share of the debtors' assets are differ-
ent, the courts and commentators differ widely on which to deem the
home country.95 Most courts and commentators seem to regard the
country of incorporation as having the strongest claim to home coun-
try status. English private international law will accord recognition to
the foreign dissolution of a company when the dissolution has taken
place under the law of the country of incorporation. 96 In the United
States, most bankruptcies of large public companies occur in the juris-
diction of the state in which they are incorporated-usually Dela-
ware-even though they rarely have either headquarters or assets
there.97 In BCCI, the world community had little difficulty accepting
90 In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1040 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Although
Maxwell was headquartered and managed in England and incurred most of its debt there,
approximately 80 percent of its assets were located in the United States, most notably its
subsidiaries Macmillan, Inc. and Official Airlines Guide, Inc.").
91 See Scott, supra note 24, at 492 (describing the formal organization of BCCI).
92 See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Over-
view and Comment, with U.S. Interest in Mind, 23 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 25, 37 (1997) (noting that
BCCI's "main operational base was in England"); BCCI Scandal Tarnishes Luxembourg's Fi-
nancial Image, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories
(noting that "Luxembourg banking authorities had ordered the BCCI . . . to move its
headquarters to London byJune 30, 1991 ... because only one per cent of its turnover was
handled [in Luxembourg], making effective control of its operations impossible"); Luxem-
bourg Court To Rule on BCCI Creditor Compensation Plan, REUTER LIBR. RP., Oct. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories ("The headquarters of BCCI was in Luxembourg,
but.., most of its operations were in other countries, particularly Britain").
93 SeeAndrew Hill, BCCIDebt Proposal Resisted by Creditors, FIN. TIMm (London), Oct. 8,
1992, at 22.
94 See Richard Donkin, Troubled BCC Shifts Base to Abu Dhabi, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 20, 1990, at 34 ("Bank of Credit and Commerce International today officially moves
its headquarters from London to the United Arab Emirates, leaving behind new question
marks about its future."). BCCI collapsed in earlyJuly 1991. See Central Bank Chiefs Vow To
Learn Lessons from BCCJ Debacle, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Wire
Service Stories (noting details of collapse).
95 For example, Bankruptcy Code § 304 authorizes deference to bankruptcy cases
commenced in the debtor's place of incorporation, headquarters, or location of "principal
assets." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 (23)-(24), 304 (1994).
96 See Felixstowe Dock and Ry. Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 2 All. E.R. 77, 93 (Q.B. 1988)
(noting that "the English practice is to regard the courts of the country of incorporation as
the principal forum for controlling the winding up of a company"); IAN F. FLETCHER, THE
LAw OF INSOLVENCY 760-61 (2d ed. 1996).
97 See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, ShappingforJudges: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CoRNELL L. Rxv. (forthcoming May
1999) (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
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Luxembourg as the main forum for the company's liquidation, even
though BCCI's sole ties to the jurisdiction were incorporation and a
"brass plate" headquarters.98 Both the Bankruptcy Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union99 and the new model law promulgated by UNCITRAL to
govern international bankruptcy'00 establish presumptions that a
debtor's country of incorporation is the debtor's home country.' 0 '
But the notion that a debtor's country of incorporation should be
considered the debtor's home country is not universally accepted.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recently recommended
that the U.S. Congress delete place of incorporation as a sufficient
basis for venue in domestic bankruptcy cases' 0 2 because it is "contrary
to the spirit of all the federal venue provisions [, and] it lets the initiat-
ing party look at factors most convenient to itself and pick the jurisdic-
tion it wants without regard to the other parties to the action."'03 If
Congress acts on the recommendation, Delaware, which currently is
the venue chosen for the majority of large public company bankrupt-
cies, no longer would be even a permissible venue for the vast majority
of them. Professor Westbrook, the leading American commentator
on international bankruptcy and co-leader of the U.S. delegation that
negotiated the UNCITRAL model law, interprets that law as directing
the courts to consider the country where the debtor's headquarters
are located as its home country.'0 4 Consistent with that interpreta-
98 The Luxembourg liquidators eventually recovered $4.6 billion, enough to pay 46
cents on the dollar to BCCI's general creditors. See, e.g., Jon Ashworth & Richard Miles,
BCCI Dividend Cheers Creditors, THE TIMES (London), June 5, 1998, at 41 (describing the
dividend to be paid).
99 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, Art. 3.1, 35 I.L.M. 1223
("[T]he place of the [debtor's) registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its
main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary.").
100 The model law provides for recognition of foreign proceedings as "main" proceed-
ings if they occur "where the debtor has the centre of its main interests." UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROss-BORDER INSOLVENCy Art. 2(b) (1997). Article 16(3) provides that
"[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's registered office ... is presumed to
be the centre of the debtor's main interests." Id. Art. 16(3).
101 During negotiation of the UNCITRAL model law, some delegates sought to desig-
nate the bankruptcy in the country of incorporation as the "main" proceeding. See Ber-
ends, supra note 1, at 330; see also Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 35 n.162 (suggesting that, as
an alternative to his proposal-that firms be able to select the jurisdiction of filing in their
articles of incorporation-countries require firms to file for bankruptcy in the jurisdiction
in which they are incorporated).
102 See NATIONAL BAma. REv. COMM'N, supra note 65, at 770.
103 Id. at 783.
104 See Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook to the National Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission (July 29, 1997), in NATIONAL BANa, REV. COMM'N, supra note 65, app. E-1 at 7
(referring to "the centre of its main interests" as "a concept taken from the European
Union Convention on Insolvency and akin to concepts like 'principal place of business' or
'chief executive office.'"). Taken literally, "principal place of business" might be under-
stood to refer to actual operations rather than headquarters, but U.S. courts have inter-
preted the phrase as a term of art referring to headquarters. See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
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tion, Westbrook deemed the United Kingdom the "center of gravity"
of Maxwell Communicationl 5-a term not dissimilar to the "center
of its main interests" test adopted by UNCITRAL' 06-even though
"most of the debtor's assets were in the United States."10 7
Universalists have regarded the location of the debtor's opera-
tions as probably the weakest basis for home country status.' 08 In
many cases, a company's operations will be spread among several
countries so that none has a majority. In some cases, the principal
assets will be either mobile or outside the boundaries of any coun-
try.109 Today both the United States and Canada assert worldwide ju-
risdiction over the assets of debtors on the flimsy basis that those
debtors have some assets in the country-assertions that should be dis-
concerting to universalists. 110
The greatest uncertainty as to the meaning of "home country"
results from the fact that most large firms are not single entities, but
corporate groups."' Each entity in a corporate group may have its
own country of incorporation, its own headquarters, and its own prin-
cipal asset location different from those of its parent or the group as a
whole. To date, no court or commentator has addressed directly the
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 11, 18. Professor Westbrook has expressed
reservations elsewhere about home country status based merely on place of incorporation.
SeeWestbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 486 ("I think that the U.S. is only one
of the jurisdictions that would be very hesitant to permit the laws of some tax haven to
govern the default of an enterprise whose commercial life was centered in New York,
London, or Frankfurt.").
105 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FoRDama L.
REv. 2531, 2538 (1996).
106 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY Art. 16.3 (1997).
107 Westbrook, supra note 105, at 2537.
108 But see Draft of United States of America-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, at Art. 15 (2)
(Oct. 29, 1979) (on file with author) (indicating that the countries choose an asset-based
test to determine jurisdiction).
109 See, e.g., Underwood v. Hilliard (In reRimsat, Ltd.), 98 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1996)
(involving a debtor whose primary assets were leases in satellites orbiting the earth).
110 See In re McTague, 198 B.R 428, 431-32 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (retainingjurisdic-
tion of Canadian debtor's bankruptcy filing in the United States over the objection of the
trustee on the sole ground that the debtor had $194 in a bank account in the United
States); Jeremy V. Richards, The Long Arm of Canadian Insolvency Law and a Tale of Three
Jurisdictions, 17 AM. BANKR. INsT. J. 12 (1998) (discussing a worldwide stay issued by Cana-
dian bankruptcy court against enforcement of a license entered into in England between
two English companies domiciled in England, governed by English law, and which was to
be performed exclusively in England); Cassels Brock & Blackwell, The CCAA Goes Interna-
tional... Again, NEwsLETTER: BUSINEss REORGANIZATION GROUP, June-July 1995, at 1-2
(describing the unreported opinion in In re Cadillac Fairview U.S. Inc.). In that opinion, a
Canadian bankruptcy court took jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation that had the vast
majority of its assets and operations in the United States on the basis that it had assets in
Canada: $200,000 apparently deposited in a Canadian bank account for the purpose of
conferring jurisdiction on the Canadian court. See id.
111 The problem is long-standing. See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, The Nationality of Inter-
national Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 993 (1952) (advocating a realist approach to the
problem).
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critical question of whether the home country that administers the
multinational bankruptcy case is determined once for the entire cor-
porate group, separately for each member of the group, or for the
financially distressed entities of the group as a whole." 2
To illustrate the problem, assume that U, the U.S. parent corpora-
tion of a corporate group that operates under a single trademark, is
financially sound. C, a Canadian company with relatively minor oper-
ations in Canada, and F, a French company with major operations in
France, are subsidiaries of U. Both C and F are in financial difficulty.
C has a subsidiary, G, that has extensive operations in Germany. G is
not in financial difficulty. If C files bankruptcy, universalists might
conclude that any of the four countries involved should be the home
country. First, one might argue that this integrated group should be
regarded as a single debtor whose home country is the United States.
Under this view, the parent should be considered in determining the
home country, even though it is not in financial difficulty, because its
assets might be needed for reorganization or unified sale." 3 If so, the
fact that the corporate group is headquartered in the United States
probably would make the United States the home country, even
though most of the operations are abroad.' 1 4
Second, one might argue that even though a group analysis is
appropriate, a nonfiling parent should be ignored.115 This approach
112 See, e.g., SIGAL r AL., supra note 14, at 95 (referring to "a tension between the
economic and legal organization of business activities which has generally not been ade-
quately dealt with in traditional insolvency processes"); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 567
(noting that "[t]he coordination process in a transnational bankruptcy is often compli-
cated by the presence of subsidiaries and affiliates in the various concerned countries" and
that "[a]greement on the basic principles of commercial responsibility and the principles
that would govern jurisdiction within a corporation group would save considerable time
and expense and reduce the general confusion"). But seeJacob Ziegel, Corporate Groups and
NAFJA Insolvencies, in TRANSNATIONAL INsOLVENCY PROJECr: PROCEDURES FOR COOPERATION
IN INTRNATnONAL INsoLVENcY CASES WITHIN NAFMA (American Law Inst. ed., Preliminary
Draft No. 1, 1998) (describing the problem but proposing no solution).
113 For a discussion of Bramalea, a case in which a Canadian court proceeded under
this view, see infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
114 Aside from the fact that the U.S. parent was not in financial difficulty, the case
would be almost identical to Maxwell See Westbrook, supra note 105, at 2534 (describing
Maxwell as having "its true 'seat' in London ... but with its principal assets in the United
States"). The BCCI bankruptcy buttresses the argument that courts should consider the
characteristics of the controlling parent. In BCC, the world deferred to the bankruptcy
court of Luxembourg because it was the country of incorporation of the parent entity. See,
e.g., In re Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l S.A- (No. 10), 2 W.L.R. 172 (Ch. 1997) (defer-
ring to Luxembourg as main forum, even though the parent entity was largely just a shell,
but nevertheless applying English law to matter in issue). The BCCI parent corporation
owned two subsidiaries. See Scott, supra note 24, at 492. The subsidiaries owned the numer-
ous sub-subsidiaries that constituted the corporate group. See id. One of the subsidiaries
was also incorporated in Luxembourg, but the other was incorporated in the Cayman Is-
lands. See id.
115 For example, the court ignored the parent in the Allied Stores/Federated Department
Stores case. Allied and Federated, both U.S. companies, were subsidiaries of Campeau, a
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would point to Canada as the home country.11 6 Third, one might ar-
gue that the home country decision should be based solely on the
location of the distressed entities. Because F is the larger of the two
distressed entities, France should be considered the group's home
country under this view. Lastly, one might argue that in the absence
of a filing by U, the Canadian/German and French firms should be
regarded as separate groups, each with its own home country. Using
this approach, Germany should be regarded as the home country of
the Canadian/German group because the group carries on the bulk
of its operations in Germany. The fact that the German subsidiary is
not in financial distress is irrelevant because its assets are in effect the
assets of the debtor.117 Thus, even in the relatively simple example
considered here, the home country test proves almost entirely
indeterminate.
3. The Extent ofJurisdiction over Corporate Groups
Principal rationales for the adoption of the universalist approach
require that the home country bankruptcy court take jurisdiction over
other members of the group whose operations are integrated with
those of the debtor. This jurisdiction may need to include members
of the corporate group that are financially sound. Otherwise, the
bankruptcy court of the home country may not control all of the assets
necessary to reorganize the business *or to liquidate it for the best
price." 8
Bramalea, an unreported case in the Ontario Court of Justice, il-
lustrates some surprising consequences of such an extension ofjuris-
diction. In a Canadian filing by a Canadian parent company, a
Canadian bankruptcy court not only imposed a global stay of proceed-
ings,' 19 but also assumed jurisdiction over U.S subsidiaries that had
Canadian firm that did not file. See Campeau Subsidiaries File for Chapter 11, PR NmvswxE,
Jan. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories. Allied filed in Cincinnati, Federated
filed in San Francisco, and the court transferred the latter case to Cincinnati for joint
administration. See id. Apparently no party argued that the case should proceed in
Canada.
116 The precedents of Maxwelland BCCtsuggest that once Cfiles in Canada, the Cana-
dian court should have jurisdiction over , the German subsidiary, as well.
117 Many, if not all, of Maxwell's U.S. assets were financially sound subsidiaries. See
Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclay's Bank (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.),
170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). The parent, Maxwell Communication Corpora-
tion, filed the U.S. Bankruptcy and is the same entity that filed in the United Kingdom.
Macmillan Publishing, one of the American subsidiaries, did file chapter 11, but only late
in the Maxwell case and only to facilitate its sale. See In re Macmillan, Inc., No. 93-45625
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 10, 1993).
118 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
119 See R. Gordon Marantz, The Reorganization of a Complex Corporate Entity: The Bramalea
Story, in CASE STUDIES IN RECENT CANADIAN INSOLVENcY REORGANIZATIONS 1, 30 (Jacob S.
Ziegel ed., 1997) (setting forth the text of paragraph 13(e) of the court oider).
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not filed bankruptcy in either jurisdiction. 120 As a result, "in some
very clear instances, loans by U.S. lenders to U.S. single-asset subsidiar-
ies which owned U.S. real estate projects and carried on business in
the U.S., were made subject to modification in the Canadian proceed-
ings."'' Not only did the court take jurisdiction over wholly U.S. sub-
sidiaries, it consolidated the entire Bramalea group into a single
estate-without making the requisite findings to justify consolidation
under U.S. law. As one commentator described it:
Creditors were assigned to [six] classes without particular reference
to the subsidiary or affiliate against which they held their claim....
When Bramalea filed a plan which substantively consolidated its
creditors and assets, it eliminated the boundaries between its subsid-
iaries and affiliates. Most lenders with exposures to subsidiaries
found themselves with exposures to the Bramalea group as a
whole.122
Assuming that Canada was Bramalea's home country, such a
broad exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with the argument for
universalism. To assure the reorganization of an "integrated" multina-
tional enterprise, the home court needed jurisdiction over the entire
enterprise.123 However, such a broad exercise of jurisdiction sub-
jected lending transactions that occurred between U.S. lenders and
still-solvent U.S.-based and U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries of Bramalea
to Canadian jurisdiction solely because the subsidiaries were owned by
and "integrated" into a Canadian-based business. In such circum-
stances, the universalists' argument that U.S. creditors-presumably
including trade creditors-should have anticipated an assertion ofju-
risdiction by Canada reaches the level of absurdity.'2 4 The universal-
ists would expect creditors entering into entirely domestic
transactions to discover and take into account not just the nationality
of their debtors, but also the nationality of the present and future
owners of their debtors.125
The Bramalea court applied neither an entity nor an enterprise
test to determine the appropriate reach of its home country powers.
Instead, it premised its jurisdiction over particular entities on the "in-
120 See id. at 15.
121 SIGAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 95-96.
122 Id. at 96.
123 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., Marantz, supra note 119, at 17. ("In making loans to such [single-asset]
subsidiaries, [U.S.] lenders would usually assume that they had successfully insulated them-
selves from the risk of any financial decay that might occur higher up in the Bramalea
empire at its head office in Canada.").
125 See id. ("The Bramalea reorganization could be (and was) perceived to involve an
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Canadian court in a manner inconsistent
with U.S. bankruptcy policy and in a manner prejudicial to the rights of U.S. creditors.").
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tegration" of those entities into Bramalea's business.' 26 Presumably, if
some U.S. subsidiaries were integrated and others were not, the Cana-
dian court would have asserted jurisdiction only over the former and
permitted the latter to file bankruptcy petitions in the United States.
While this "integration" test may make sense as a matter of bank-
ruptcy administration, it wreaks havoc with ex ante predictability. If a
universalist system employed the integration test, lenders could pre-
dict which country's law would govern a subsidiary's bankruptcy only
by first predicting whether the subsidiary was "integrated" into the
business of its parent.
Yet to reject the integration test would leave the universalists with
only three remaining options, none of which is viable. First, they
could advocate that the home country of the entity that is the subject
of the bankruptcy case have jurisdiction only over that entity. But in
some cases, limiting the jurisdiction in this manner would leave for-
eign portions of the enterprise necessary for reorganization or effi-
cient liquidation-including related corporations in bankruptcy in
other jurisdictions-beyond the reach of the home country bank-
ruptcy court. Second, they could suggest that the home country of
the corporate group have jurisdiction over the entire group, solvent
or insolvent, integrated or not. But such expansive jurisdiction would
inject international bankruptcy considerations into wholly domestic
transactions between solvent, independent firms for the sole reason
that they now happen to be owned by a foreign parent or might some-
day be acquired by one. Third, they could propose a flexible test that
looks to the home country of the entity or the group, as appropriate
in the particular case. But that would invite strategic manipulation by
debtors in their choice of courts in which to file. It would also expose
the unpredictability of universalism.
4. Strategic Manipulation of the "Home Country" Standard
Even if one could identify the debtor's home country at the time
the bankruptcy case was filed, strategic manipulation of the home
country standard would remain a problem. Debtors who anticipated
filing bankruptcy would change their attributes to assure jurisdiction
over their cases in debtor-friendly countries. In short, they would fo-
rum shop.
Large corporate debtors engage in rampant forum shopping
among bankruptcy courts in the United States. 12 7 In recent years, well
over half of all cases have proceeded in a locale other than that of the
126 See SiGoA ET AL., supra note 14, at 95 ("The Court accepted Bramalea's contention
that it was, by and large, a single integrated business .. ").
127 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1); LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 104, at 12.
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company's headquarters12 8-the locale that universalist standards
most likely would identify as the home country.129 Although the
courts in which the cases are filed have the authority to transfer them,
transfers are rare. 30 In part, this infrequency of transfers results from
judges' reluctance to transfer cases that would otherwise bring tens or
even hundreds of millions of dollars in business to local profession-
als.' 3 ' Bankruptcy is an industry for which local communities com-
pete.132 Not surprisingly, debtors take full advantage of this
competition.
Under universalism, the reasons to expect forum shopping inter-
nationally considerably exceed the reasons to expect it within the
United States. The uniformity of both bankruptcy law and bankruptcy
procedure in the United States limits the rewards of a successful shop
within the United States. The rewards are so subtle that some scholars
believe they are nonexistent 33 A successful international shop, how-
ever, could offer much greater rewards. Because the shop would
change the debtor's home country, the shop might change the priori-
ties among creditors, render security interests invalid, or change the
law governing avoiding powers. Shops might take cases to countries
with corruptible judges, different languages, different treaty relation-
ships, or locations inconvenient to creditors.
Just as Delaware competes as a "haven" for domestic bankruptcy
cases, Bermuda, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands stand ready to
compete as havens for international bankruptcies. 34 One easily could
imagine a universalist world of the near future in which over half of all
large multinational bankruptcy cases are filed in Bermuda, just as
more than half of all large U.S. bankruptcy cases today are filed in
Delaware. 135 In that world, the Bermuda legislature would set the rel-
ative bankruptcy priorities of creditors throughout the world.
128 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1).
129 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 14243 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 104, at 37-38.
132 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., BankruptcyJudges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REv. 1 (1998) (applauding the competition).
133 Compare Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 30) (arguing that pref-
erences regarding judges motivate forum shopping), with Robert K Rasmussen & Randall
S. Thomas, Improving Corporate Bankruptcy Law Through Venue Reform 23 (1997) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that speed and efficiency motivate
forum shopping).
134 For example, Bermuda will host Insol's "Conference of the Americas" in April of
1999. Insol, based in London, is the leading organization of international insolvency pro-
fessionals. Bermuda has a population of only 62,000. WALL STREEJouRNAL ALMANAc 373
(1999).
135 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1).
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Debtors could accomplish shops by a variety of means. The most
obvious means would be to move the company's headquarters 36 to
the preferred country before filing the case. Contrary to the asser-
tions of some universalists, moving the headquarters of a large com-
pany is neither difficult nor unusual.'3 7 Such moves were made on
the eves of several major domestic bankruptcies. 3 8 While an interna-
tional move theoretically might be more difficult, they are hardly un-
known. For example, BCCI moved its headquarters from London to
Abu Dhabi shortly before filing its bankruptcy case in Luxembourg. 3 9
Dreco Energy moved its headquarters and its center of gravity from
Canada to the United States on the eve of its bankruptcy and then
moved it back afterwards. 140 To do this, Dreco divested itself of Cana-
dian properties and Canadian employees before filing its bankruptcy
case in Houston, Texas, and then it did the opposite after concluding
its case. 141
If, as seems likely, courts determine a corporate group's home
country only by reference to the locations of entities filing bankruptcy
(and their subsidiaries), corporate groups will have additional forum-
shopping opportunities. As several commentators have noted, venue
once invoked is difficult to change.' 42 The cases "grow roots" as the
courts take control: the representatives of the estates begin making
and executing business decisions, and creditors, shareholders, and
others arrange for representation at the forum. Within days, it be-
comes difficult to move a case; within weeks, it becomes
unthinkable. 143
Most entities have some flexibility as to when they file. Successive
filings-filings by one or more members of the group followed later
136 As previously noted, neither the location of a company's assets nor its jurisdiction
of incorporation likely carries nearly as much weight in the determination of the home
country as the location of the company's headquarters. See supra notes 95-110 and accom-
panying text.
137 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 104, at 18-19 (presenting data on the frequency
of such moves).
138 Headquarter relocations occurred prior to the bankruptcy filings by Amdura, Bald-
win United, Continental Airlines, Evans Products, Memorex, Michigan General, Tacoma
Boatbuilding, and the Wickes Companies. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research
Database (1999) (unpublished database, on file with author).
139 BCCI moved its headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi in September 1990. See
Donkin, supra note 94. It collapsed in July 1991. See id.
140 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 104, at 28 n.63.
141 See id.
142 See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPA-
NIES 7 (1997) (noting that "the longer the original district retains [a] case, the more ra-
tional it becomes to retain it"); Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 28);
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 104, at 24 (relaying that "the likelihood of a change of
venue in the . .. cases we studied was small").
143 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 97 (manuscript at 28-29).
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by filings of other members-are common. 44 If the courts respected
venue in the home country of the filing entity, corporate groups could
manipulate the venues of their bankruptcies by manipulating the or-
der in which group members filed. For example, assume that a group
consists of a U.S. parent corporation and a German subsidiary. If only
the subsidiary fies and the case is in Germany, Germany will be re-
garded as the home country. If the U.S. parent files weeks later in the
United States, the universalist dilemma will be whether to consolidate
the two cases in Germany or to allow them to proceed separately.
Consolidation in the United States, the likely result under universal-
ism if both corporations filed at the same time, will be out of the ques-
tion because the German court will be well along in administering the
first case.
The particular brand of universalism practiced by the United
States and some other countries adds to the possibility of such manip-
ulations. These countries not only assert jurisdiction over all of a
debtor's assets worldwide but also enjoin everyone involved from fil-
ing bankruptcy proceedings involving those assets in other countries.
Thus, if the parent of a corporate group files in the United States,
U.S. law will bar creditors who believe that Canada is in fact the home
country from filing a bankruptcy case there.145 As a result, the United
States will have the power to determine the home country of the
debtor for the sole reason that the first case was filed in the United
States. If would-be bankruptcy havens adopt the same rule and debt-
ors file first in those havens, U.S. creditors may find it difficult to chal-
lenge the havens' decisions that they are the home countries.14 6 In
effect, the debtor will determine which country determines the
debtor's home country.
5. The Unpredictability of a Universalist Approach
Universalist writers have not yet faced the choice they ultimately
must make among international systems based on home country of
entity, home country of group with jurisdiction over the entire group,
144 Successive filings occurred in the following major U.S. cases: Allegheny Internationa4
Allied Stores/Federated Department Stores, American Carriers, Beker Industries, Buttes Gas & Oi
SLM Internationa Inc., and TSL Holdings. See LoPucki, supra note 138 (fieldhead "Related
Filings").
145 See Underwood v. Hilliard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the automatic stay in a U.S. bankruptcy case barred a debtor from obtaining an order
from a foreign bankruptcy court); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 767-69
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the official receiver of the State of Israel appointed
for an insolvent bank violated the automatic stay by filing an involuntary bankruptcy peti-
tion against its debtor in Israel while that debtor was in bankruptcy in the United States).
146 One need only imagine the bankruptcy court of the Federation of Saint Kitts and
Nevis doing to the United States precisely the same thing that the Seventh Circuit did to
the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis in In re Rimsat. See In re Rimsa4 98 F.3d at 956.
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or home country of group with jurisdiction only over the "integrated"
portion. Without a clear resolution of this issue, lenders could not
predict the home country of any bankrupt entity that was a member of
a multinational corporate group. Hence they could not predict what
country's law would govern the distribution. Universalism would be
unpredictable.
That lack of predictability would infect not just the small number
of bankruptcies considered "multinational" today, but about a third of
all large corporate bankruptcy cases. That is, nearly a third of U.S.-
based, large, publicly held companies own property in foreign coun-
tries, 147 and these companies usually separately incorporate those for-
eign holdings in the particular foreign countries. 148 Uncertainty
regarding whether the home country of the entity or of the group
controls would render the home country-and thus the applicable
law-uncertain in all of these cases.
Foreign administration of foreign subsidiary bankruptcies is the
norm today. For example, TSL Holdings, Inc. filed for reorganization
in Santa Barbara, California in March 1993.149 TSL made three suc-
cessive announcements over a period of five weeks in July and August
of that year: (1) its German subsidiary filed for bankruptcy in Ger-
many; (2) its French subsidiary filed for bankruptcy in France; and (3)
its Netherlands subsidiary filed for bankruptcy in the Netherlands. 50
Under current practice-basically territoriality-this case presented
no problem. Each country supervised the bankruptcy of the entity
located within its borders. Had the United States been committed to
universalism based on the possible need to administer all the assets of
a corporate group together, however, the U.S. court would have been
forced to assert its jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries' assets, or
at the very least, it would have had to make an inquiry into the need
147 An examination of cases in the Bankruptcy Research Database reveals that of 266
large, public companies filing for bankruptcy reorganization in the United States from
1980 through 1997, 83 (31%) indicated in their 10-Ks that they owned property outside the
United States. See LoPucki, supra note 138 (fieldhead "states of operation").
148 Of the 68 companies in the Bankruptcy Research Database with foreign property
that disclosed where their subsidiaries were incorporated, 64 (94%) named one or more
foreign countries. See id. Of the 65 that indicated the number of foreign countries in-
volved, 49 (75%) had corporations in at least the number of countries in which they had
property. See id.
149 See id.
150 See New Generation Research, The Bankruptcy DataSource, available in LEXIS,
Bankruptcy DataSource-Company Profiles, News and Reorganization Plans (recording
that onJuly 6, 1993, TSL's German subsidiary filed for bankruptcy and on August 13, 1993,
TSL's French and Netherlands units filed for bankruptcy). Apogee Enterprises provides a
more recent example. On March 24, 1998, Apogee announced that four of its six French
subsidiaries commenced liquidation proceedings in France, and its U.K. subsidiary fied
liquidation proceedings in the United Kingdom. The announcement gave no suggestion
that the U.S. parent was in financial difficulty or that it had commenced bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in the United States.
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for unified administration before the foreign courts were too far
along in their proceedings. The problem would have been even more
severe if the subsidiaries filed and the foreign courts began adminis-
tration before the parent filed in the United States. 151
Finally, a universalist system would be vulnerable to filings strate-
gically made in countries with little claim to home country status. In
one particularly egregious case, an English company filed in Canada
and persuaded the Canadian court to enter a worldwide stay of the
enforcement of a license. Although the stay was of doubtful validity in
the United States, it was sufficient to force a U.S. purchaser of the
license to settle with the representative of the Canadian estate.' 52
The preceding discussion should make it apparent that universal-
ism would fail to achieve its most highly touted "advantage"-ex ante
predictability. More likely, universalism would reduce further the al-
ready low level of predictability that exists in international bankruptcy
today. Worse yet, it would interject international bankruptcy consid-
erations into entirely domestic transactions and give debtors the abil-
ity to manipulate bankruptcy distributions by manipulating their
home countries. Furthermore, universalism would not offer any real
hope of unifying control over foreign assets to permit worldwide reor-
ganizations or liquidations. The supposed advantages of universalism
are in fact unattainable.
II
MODIFIED UNVERSALISM
Given the problems with universalism, it should not be surprising
that no country has ever adopted it in its pure form. Instead, courts,
commentators, and governments give lip service to pure universalism
while pursuing watered-down versions. Westbrook dubbed the U.S.
version of universalism, described in Bankruptcy Code § 304, "modi-
fied universalism."'153
A. The System
When a multinational debtor or its creditors file a bankruptcy pe-
tition, the bankruptcy court of the forum country appoints a represen-
tative. This representative takes possession of the debtor's assets and
151 Most scholars and courts recognize the impracticality of a bankruptcy court surren-
deringjurisdiction in the midst of a case. See, e.g., BERMATr ET AL., supra note 142, at 7.
152 See Richards, supra note 110, at 12-13 (describing the case).
153 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 105, at 2533 ("'[Mlodified universalism'... is best
represented by the case law that has emerged under section 304 of the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code." (footnote omitted)); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 28 ("Universalism, in a
modified form, is the fundamental concept underlying U.S. approaches to cross-border
insolvency. ... ).
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either sells them or uses them to reorganize. Most national bank-
ruptcy systems, including those of the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, claim jurisdiction over the assets of a filing debtor
wherever located, including assets located in other nations.1 54 The
representative under such a law can take possession of, and sell or use,
assets in other nations, just as a purchaser from the debtor could in
the absence of bankruptcy. However, if the representative encounters
resistance in the other nations-from a sheriff who has seized the as-
sets on behalf of a local creditor, from an administrative agency that
refuses to register the estate's title, or from a potential buyer con-
cerned with the marketability of the title-the representative may
need the assistance of a local court.
Bankruptcy Code § 304 authorizes the qualified representatives
of foreign bankruptcy estates to seek such assistance by filing ancillary
proceedings in the United States. 155 For the foreign representative to
qualify, the foreign bankruptcy must take place in a country "in which
the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or princi-
pal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding."1 56
This standard is similar to the standard for proper venue in domestic
bankruptcy cases.1 57 In effect, under the modified universalism con-
templated by Bankruptcy Code § 304, the debtor or creditors filing
the case determine which country will serve as the main forum.
Although the U.S. standard for recognition constrains the choice of a
country, this standard may leave a particular debtor free to choose
among several countries.
When a qualified foreign representative files such an ancillary
proceeding, Bankruptcy Code § 304 authorizes, but does not require,
154 See WOOD, supra note 59, §§ 14-19 to -20, at 240-41 (listing England, the United
States, Argentina, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as claiming all assets globally
and only Japan as limiting proceedings to territorial property).
155 See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
156 Id. § 101(23).
157 The domestic standard, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1408, approves filing in the district:
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or en-
tity that is the subject of such case have been located for the one hundred
and eighty days immediately preceding such commencement, or for a
longer portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the domi-
cile, residence, or principal place of business, in the United States, or prin-
cipal assets in the United States, of such person were located in any other
district; or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning such
person's affiliate, general partner, or partnership.
Id. Two important differences exist between the domestic standard for proper venue and
the standard for recognition of foreign proceedings. First, the domestic standard requires
the debtor's presence in the district for some minimum period before the debtor can file
while the foreign standard permits recognition of proceedings filed in a country to which
the debtor has just moved. Second, the domestic standard expressly addresses the entities
problem while the foreign standard ignores it.
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the U.S. bankruptcy court to protect the U.S. assets of the foreign
estate from actions by U.S. creditors and to order turnover of the U.S.
assets to the foreign representative in certain circumstances. In decid-
ing whether to turn over the U.S. assets, the bankruptcy court is to be
guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious ad-
ministration of such estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in
such estate;
(2) protection of claimholders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such
foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in ac-
cordance with the order prescribed by this title;(5) Comity .... 158
Unless the foreign representative can obtain the assistance of the U.S.
bankruptcy court, creditors remain free to"proceed against and liqui-
date the debtor's U.S. assets to satisfy their own claims. In deciding
whether to assist the foreign representative, the U.S. bankruptcy court
evaluates the bankruptcy system of the main forum. If that system
would distribute the assets "substantial[ly] in accordance with the or-
der prescribed by [the U.S. Bankruptcy Code],"' 9 the U.S. bank-
ruptcy court can order the surrender of U.S. assets to the foreign
representative. 160 If not, the U.S. bankruptcy court can either refuse
cooperation and allow the struggle over the U.S.-assets to proceed
under U.S. law, or it can offer to surrender the assets to the foreign
representative in return for assurances that the representative will
make a special distribution of those assets that protects the rights of
the U.S. creditors under U.S. law.161
To illustrate the operation of a worldwide system of modified uni-
versalism, assume that the United States is the home country of a
debtor with worldwide operations. As under pure universalism, the
158 11 U.S.C. § 304(c).
159 Id.
160 Some commentators argue that courts should balance the requirement to act con-
sistently with "comity" against the requirement to act consistently with the distribution re-
quired under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Van Osdell, supra note 18, at 1328-29
(advocating balancing and characterizing it as the majority view). However, no balancing
should be necessary because no tension exists between the two requirements. "[T]he well-
recognized rule between states and nations... permits a country to first protect the rights
of its own citizens in local property before permitting it to be taken out of the jurisdiction
for administration in favor of those residing beyond their borders." Disconto Gesellschaft
v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 582 (1908).
161 See Knecht, supra note 3, at 306-14 (discussing decisions in which U.S. bankruptcy
courts "have conditionally deferred to foreign insolvency proceedings").
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debtor would file for bankruptcy in the United States. The U.S. court
would have the right to administer the assets of the debtor worldwide,
to determine whether to reorganize or liquidate the company based
on U.S. law, and to distribute the assets of the company among credi-
tors and shareholders based on their priorities under U.S. law. In
contrast to pure universalism, however, the courts of each foreign
country involved would decide whether to render assistance to the
U.S. court based on factors such as those in Bankruptcy Code § 304.
As a result, foreign countries refusing to cooperate could constrain
the U.S. court's power to administer the assets worldwide.
B. Claimed Advantages
Probably the most important advantage of modified universalism
over pure universalism is the ability to refuse cooperation that would
prejudice U.S. creditors. Under modified universalism, the U.S. court
can examine or even negotiate the treatment of U.S. creditors in the
foreign proceeding before surrendering U.S. assets to the foreign tri-
bunal. This power confines the universalist aspect of modified univer-
salism to the type of bankruptcy system for which it is appropriate-
those in which all jurisdictions distribute assets according to essen-
tially the same priorities and recognize the claims of foreign creditors
on essentially the same basis as those of domestic creditors.
Limiting the systems with which the United States will cooperate
also reduces the advantage to be gained through forum shopping.
Thus, even though the particular brand of modified universalism
adopted by the United States may give the multinational debtor a
choice of forum, the choice is restrained by the future willingness of a
U.S. bankruptcy court to accede to it.
Under modified universalism, a court is likely to be active in every
country in which the debtor has substantial assets. However, in many
cases only one court must determine claims and make a distribution.
This determination by a single court eliminates the necessity for coun-
try-by-country filing and determination of claims and arguably en-
hances the ability of the system to achieve a worldwide pro rata
distribution of assets.
C. Problems
In contrast to pure universalism, modified universalism relieves
courts of the non-forum country from the obligation to sacrifice their
own creditors' interests for the benefit of foreigners. In doing so,
however, it sacrifices nearly all of the supposed advantages of
universalism.
Universalism is touted as predictable from the lender's viewpoint
because the lender needs to know only the debtor's home country to
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know what bankruptcy regime would apply.162 Assuming this predict-
ability, universalists argue that interest rates would be lower in such a
system. 163 Modified universalism introduces two additional uncertain-
ties, however, that make predictability untenable. First, the regime or
regimes that will ultimately distribute the debtor's assets may depend
on the country in which the assets are located at the time of bank-
ruptcy. To illustrate, assume that Debtor Corporation, a Swiss corpo-
ration, has $1 million in assets. If those assets are located in
Switzerland at the time of the bankruptcy, Swiss law will govern the
distribution. If they are located in the United States, the choice of law
will depend on whether the Swiss distribution would be substantially
different than the U.S. distribution. If it would, the United States will
refuse to surrender the assets. Ultimately, those assets will be distrib-
uted under U.S. law. Second, for the lender to predict the regime
applicable to distribution at the time of the loan, the lender must
guess what intercountry differences in bankruptcy law the forum court
will consider substantial.
The universalist envisions a single court administering the bank-
ruptcy worldwide. Reducing the number of courts participating in the
bankruptcy and the complexity of the issues would reduce transaction
costs. But modified universalism could generate a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in every country in which the debtor has assets, and perhaps
even more. 164 To decide whether a home country's bankruptcy law
would distribute the local assets substantially in accordance with the
local bankruptcy code, the ancillary court must determine how the
home country's court would distribute the assets. To make this deter-
mination, the ancillary court must hear testimony on the foreign
law.165 If it then decides to surrender the assets conditionally, it must
negotiate an agreement with the court of the home country. If it in-
stead decides not to surrender the assets, it either may distribute the
assets itself or let another local court distribute them. For a debtor
that operates in dozens of countries, modified universalism may ne-
cessitate dozens of complex proceedings. 166
Experience under Bankruptcy Code § 304 indicates that foreign
law distribution of U.S. assets frequently would prejudice U.S. credi-
162 Part I.C.5 argues that such predictability would not actually exist.
163 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Guzmn, supra note 1, at 21.
164 For example, a creditor or trustee might initiate proceedings in the United States
to obtain discovery here, even though the debtor has no assets in the United States.
165 See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear De Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 193
(3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the necessity for testimony on foreign law in deciding whether
to defer to foreign bankruptcy proceedings).
166 For an illustration of this point, see, for example, In re Bank of Credit and Commerce
International S.A., 4 All E.R 796 (Q.B. 1966) (describing the U.K. proceedings in the BCCI
case).
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tors. Even the relatively minor differences between the bankruptcy
laws of the United States and those of Canada 16 7 and Australia 6 have
proven sufficiently prejudicial in some circumstances to warrant refus-
als to cooperate. Given the wide differences in bankruptcy regimes
throughout the world, modified universalism will often, if not usually,
lead to a refusal to cooperate.
The vague standard specifying when cooperation is required in-
vites disingenuity. As Westbrook has pointed out, the provisions of
Bankruptcy Code § 304 "can easily be construed to prevent deferral in
every case that matters. "169 Some believe the courts generally have so
construed them. 170
Although modified universalism lowers the stakes in international
bankruptcy forum shopping, it does not address the core problem of
identifying the home country. All of the mischievious incentives that
afflict a purely universalist system also would afflict a modified univer-
salist system, but at lower levels. This reduction in stakes should not
give much comfort, however. Far lower stakes have generated ram-
pant forum shopping in the United States. 171 Even if no differences
in distributions existed, countries still would compete for the billion-
dollar-a-year business of reorganizing multinational companies. The
version of modified universalism currently embodied in Bankruptcy
Code § 304 allows the debtor or creditor filing a petition to choose
among countries, 172 making it particularly subject to strategic
manipulation.
Foreign representatives can bypass the modified universalism of
Bankruptcy Code § 304 by seeking cooperation in a different U.S.
court or in a different kind of proceeding. 173 For example, while
167 See In reToga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (involving a U.S.
court's denial of a Canadian bankruptcy trustee's request for an injunction against U.S.
proceedings).
168 See Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star (In re KKL (Kangaroo
Line) Pty Ltd.), 102 B.R. 373, 380 (D.N.J. 1988) (involving a U.S. court's denial of relief to
an Australian-bankruptcy trustee).
169 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 472.
170 For example, Knecht argues that:
[T]he majority of the cases in which the courts have advocated unitary
bankruptcy proceedings serve only as a "drapery of illusion'"-an outward
commitment to international comity that disguises the protectionism lurk-
ing beneath. As soon as the foreign proceedings slightly compromise the
interests of United States creditors, most United States courts quickly dis-
card this drapery and reveal their strong commitment to protecting their
principal concern, U.S. creditors.
Knecht, supra note 3, at 288.
171 See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
173 For example, Bankruptcy § 303(4) authorizes the filing of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case "by a foreign representive of the estate in a foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(4) (1994). For discussion of a case in which a foreign representative successfully
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Maxwell Communication's case was pending in the United Kingdom,
the debtor filed a second case under Chapter 11 .ofi the Bankruptcy
Code. The U.S. bankruptcy court then appointed'aft examiner who
negotiated an agreement with the British administrators. 7 4 The re-
sult was to give U.S. cooperation without a determination that it was
appropriate under Bankruptcy Code § 304. In BCC, the representa-
tive of the Luxembourg bankruptcy estate blatantly evaded § 304 by
negotiating an agreement with two U.S. prosecutors who claimed the
U.S. assets.' 75 Together, the prosecutors and the representative took
the agreement to a United States District Court for approval under
RICO. 176 The District Court allowed the representative to take $275
million out of the United States over the objection of the U.S. credi-
tors.177 The court did not apply the standard of Bankruptcy Code
§ 304, which Luxembourg probably did not satisfy.1 7s
A modified universalist system might avoid such "back doors," but
the establishment of a system that legitimizes the claims of foreign
representatives to assets in the United States encourages foreign rep-
resentatives, U.S. prosecutors, and others to inventmthem. Such back
doors likely will plague any system based on universalism.
Most bankruptcy regimes empower an estate representative to
avoid as preferential or fraudulent various transactions that the debtor
entered into before the filing of the case, 179 but the nature and scope
used this provision as an alternative to § 304, see Henry Lewis Goodman et al., Use of United
States Bankruptcy Law in Multinational Insolvencies: The Axona Litigation-Issues, Tactics, and
Implications for the Future, 9 BANi. Dav. J. 19 (1992). Although no data exist on the
number of secondary bankruptcies filed in the United States, data on the number of § 304
proceedings filed and anecdotal evidence on the frequency of secondary bankruptcies sug-
gest that bypass is common. Only 25 proceedings were filed in the United States under
§ 304 in the year ending in September 1996. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDIcAL Busi-
NESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 262 n.* (1996).
174 Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclay's Bank (In re Maxwell Communication
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
175 See Hal S. Scott, Multinational Bank Insolvencies: The United States and BCC, in Cur-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CoRPoRATE'INSOLVENCY LAW 733,
738-39 (Jaccb S. Ziegel ed., 1994) (describing the U.S. BCCI litigation). The agreement is
properly characterized as an evasion of Bankruptcy Code § 304 because, absent the agree-
ment, the § 304 standard would have governed the U.S. surrender of funds to Luxem-
bourg, while pursuant to the agreement, the courts approved surrender of the funds to
Luxembourg without requiring adherence to the § 304 standard. See Smouha v. Sturge (In
re Smouha), 136 B.R. 921, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting U.S. creditor's argument that the
forfeiture provision of the Plea Agreement "'eviscerates the [section 304 proceeding]'"
(quoting Appellant's Brief at 16)).
176 See In re Smouha, 136 B.R. at 924.
177 See Scott, supra note 175, at 739.
178 See In re Smouha, 136 B.R. at 929 (approving the settlement); Scott, supra note 175,
at 738-39.
179 See WooD, supra note 59, § 4, at 72-84 (describing the national systems for prefer-
ence avoidance ii general terms).
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of this empowerment differs among regimes.18 0 Courts and commen-
tators differ as to which country's avoiding powers a multinational
bankruptcy should recognize. 18 1 Bankruptcy Code § 304 does not ad-
dress the problem.
Professor Westbrook devised an elegant solution to the problem
in the context of pure universalism. He observes that the purpose of
avoiding powers is to rebalance a distribution improperly skewed by
some prepetition transfer. Under universalism, the imbalance occurs
with reference to the priority law of the home country, so the avoiding
powers of the home country-which probably were devised to comple-
ment that priority law-should be applied.'8 2 When universalism is
modified, however, the priority laws of other nations come into play
and Westbrook's solution fails.183 Modified universalism remains
without a coherent doctrine governing avoiding powers.
III
SECONDARY BANKRUPTCY
A. The System
In a "secondary bankruptcy" system, bankruptcy proceedings si-
multaneously can go forward in each country in which the debtor has
a substantial presence.' 8 4 As with modified universalism, the proceed-
ing in the debtor's home country serves as the "main" proceeding to
which the courts of other jurisdictions are expected to surrender as-
sets for distribution. 8 5 But in contrast to the ancillary proceedings of
modified universalism, which function only in aid of the main pro-
ceeding, the secondary bankruptcies are the same proceedings that
would be filed even if no foreign proceedings were pending. They
can, and do, reorganize or liquidate the local assets of the debtor.
180 See id. § 7, at 122-36 (comparing the preference rules of major jurisdictions).
181 Westbrook lists five possible choices of avoidance rules. See Westbrook, Avoidance
supra note 1, at 525.
182 See id. at 508-10.
183 Westbrook does not concede this failure. He does agree, however, that his ration-
ale does not apply under modified universalism "unless the United States court is ulti-
mately going to turn over the proceeds of avoidance to the foreign court or distribute in
accordance with a worldwide distribution under the guidance of that court." Id. at 536. In
other words, he admits that his rationale does not hold unless the particular brand of
modified universalism yields an unmodified universalist distribution.
184 The test of significant presence that courts most commonly employ asks whether
the debtor has an "establishment" in the country. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCy Art. 2(c) (1997) (describing a "foreign non-main proceeding"
as one "taking place in a state where the debtor has an establishment").
185 SeeJohn K. Londot, Note, Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy:
Assessing the International Bar Association's Concordat, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 163, 173 (1996) ("In
secondary bankruptcy practice, a country distributes local assets to local creditors accord-
ing to its own priority system, and delivers any remainder to the administrative forum for
distribution to remaining creditors, according to the administrative forum's priorities.").
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For example, when creditors filed against Maxwell in the United
Kingdom, Maxwell responded by filing a case under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.186 This Chapter 11 case was a "secondary
bankruptcy" rather than an ancillary proceeding because it was a type
of proceeding that could alone reorganize or liquidate the company.
Maxwell's Chapter 11 case differed from the Bankruptcy Code
§ 304 proceeding contemplated under modified universalism in two
respects. First, Maxwell could not have filed a § 304 proceeding be-
cause Maxwell was not the representative of a foreign bankruptcy
court.187 The right to file under Bankruptcy Code § 304 belonged
only to the administrators that the English bankruptcy court was
about to appoint. Second, the sole purpose of the § 304 proceeding
would have been to aid the English proceeding. The U.S. bankruptcy
court either could have granted or denied aid under § 304, but could
not have independently reorganized or liquidated Maxwell's U.S.
assets. 188
In a secondary bankruptcy case, the court reorganizes or liqui-
dates the debtor's local assets and makes distributions necessary to
protect creditors entitled to priority under local law.189 The court
then transfers the balance of the proceeds to the estate of the main
case for distribution according to the priority rules of the home coun-
try.190 In this respect, the secondary bankruptcy system is a hybrid of
universalism and territoriality; part of the assets is distributed accord-
ing to local priorities, but the balance is distributed according to
home country priorities.
To illustrate the operation of a secondary bankruptcy system
worldwide, assume again that the United States is the home country of
a debtor with worldwide operations. This debtor would file bank-
ruptcy in each of the countries in which it had operations. Its U.S.
filing would be the "main" case, and the others would be "secondary."
The secondary bankruptcy courts initially would assume jurisdiction
over the local assets, would determine whether to cooperate in a mul-
tinational reorganization or liquidation, and would distribute the as-
sets of the company among creditors to the extent of priorities
specified under local law. The secondary courts then would surrender
any remaining assets to the U.S. court.
186 See Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclay's Bank (In re Maxvell Communica-
don Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
187 See 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994) ("A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is com-
menced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign
representative."); id. § 101(24) ("'[Fjoreign representative' means duly selected trustee,
administrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding.. .
188 See id. § 304(b).
189 See Londot, supra note 185, at 173.
190 See id.
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B. Claimed Advantages
As was previously noted, priority rules differ widely among coun-
tries. 191 As a result of these differences in priority, distributions under
universalism would produce shockingly unfair results. The priority of
a Mexican employee's claim for wages, severance pay, and other bene-
fits might be fully protected or not protected at all, depending on
where the employer's bankruptcy was administered. The same would
be true of tax and many other kinds of claims that are given different
priorities in different countries. Even the most ardent universalists
acknowledge that purely universalist distributions are, at least under
current circumstances, unthinkable. 192 To date, all universalist writers
favor a "public policy" or equivalent exception to the requirement
that assets be surrendered to the home country.193
Secondary bankruptcy provides an orderly mechanism for giving
effect to local public policy, including policies embodied in rules of
distribution. Instead of refusing to surrender assets to the home
country, or conditioning their surrender on the home country's com-
mitments regarding distribution, the local court can make the distri-
butions to local creditors that it considers necessary as a condition to
cooperation. The secondary court then can surrender the balance of
the debtor's assets to the home court.
C. Problems
The principal problem with secondary bankruptcy is that the ex-
ception for local creditors swallows the rule. Bankruptcy proceedings
distribute the large bulk of assets to creditors with special priorities. 194
191 See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 470 (admitting that "it
will not be possible to apply the home-country law to all aspects of a company's insolvency.
We will stifle reform at the outset if we refuse to recognize that fact").
193 As two universalist authors wrote:
Ideally, following the principle of universality in its purest form, the sub-
stantive law of the foreign court would govern the entire proceedings ....
However, the constraints of public policy or strongly supported local bank-
ruptcy principles in the Court's own jurisdiction, may require that this basic
principle be modified and, in some instances, that local substantive law be
applied.
Chin Kim & Jimmy C.:Smith, International Insolvencies: An English-American Comparison with
an Analysis of Proposed Solutions, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 28 n.17 6 (1992)
(quoting MODEL INT'L INSOLVENCY CO-OPERATION Acr § 4 cmt. (International Bar Ass'n
1989)).
194 See Fletcher, supra note 92, at 44-45 ("In practice, no doubt, the limited pool of
assets comprising the available estate in the secondary bankruptcy will, in many cases, be
exhausted when payment has been made to those creditors whose claims enjoy preferential
status according to local insolvency law."). In U.S. business bankruptcy liquidations, se-
cured creditors capture more than 95% of the assets distributed. See Robert M. Lawless &
Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1207, 1217 tbl.3 (1997) (reporting that 4.6% of the distributions resulting
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Although one easily can identify priorities of other countries that do
not seem to rise to the level of "public policy" that overrides the uni-
versalist obligation, one seldom can identify such priorities in the laws
of one's own country. Every priority denied is a legitimate expecta-
tion denied. Not surprisingly, a secondary bankruptcy system-argua-
bly the dominant system in international bankruptcy today-results in
local assets being distributed locally and the universalist obligation be-
ing honored only nominally.
To the extent that local priorities absorb less than the entire es-
tates of bankruptcy debtors, in a secondary bankruptcy system each
country has an incentive to expand those priorities. Failure to expand
them results in the export of assets with no assurance of a correspond-
ing return. Thus, over the long run, secondary bankruptcy will have a
corrupting effect on the rules governing bankruptcy priorities within
nations.
Another problem with secondary bankruptcy, shared by modified
universalism and territoriality, is an inevitable delay between the filing
of the bankruptcy cases and the availability of local assets for interna-
tional administration by the home country. Before the foreign bank-
ruptcy court can employ the assets in a worldwide liquidation or
reorganization, the representative of each local estate must assess the
situation, arrange protection for creditors entitled to local priority,
and negotiate with the representative of the main bankruptcy for the
latter's use of the assets pending a final resolution of the case. This
delay can prevent the achievement of system objectives in two situa-
tions in which the advantages of universalism have been touted: (1)
when a company needs immediate control of both its domestic and
foreign assets to reorganize, and (2) when a higher price can be real-
ized by liquidating the domestic and foreign assets together. 95
To illustrate, assume a U.S. debtor-in-possession needs cash from
its foreign operations to finance its reorganization. The foreign rep-
resentatives might be unwilling to surrender that cash for fear that the
from business bankruptcy liquidations in five representative U.S. districts go to unsecured
creditors). Furthermore, about 40% of the distributions to unsecured creditors go to pri-
ority unsecured creditors. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO CREDI-
ToPS AND PRoFEssIoNALs 39 tbl.III.2 (1994) (showing that 21.8% of Chapter 7 estates go to
priority unsecured creditors and 36.4% go to general creditors). Thus, only about 2% of
the distributions in U.S. bankruptcy liquidations go to general unsecured creditors. In
discussing secondary bankruptcy under the proposed Strasbourg Convention, Westbrook
observed that "[t]hese secondary proceedings would permit local distribution to priority
('preferential') creditors and secured creditors, and would distribute any surplus to the
main bankruptcy. As in U.S. bankruptcies, there will rarely be much surplus to forward
after priority claims are paid." Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatim, supra note 1, at 487. The
Strasbourg Convention is "a draft proposal for international cooperation in insolvency mat-
ters" discussed by the Council of Europe. Id.
195 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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reorganization attempt will consume it to the detriment of local prior-
ity creditors. Similarly, the foreign representative of a liquidating
debtor may be reluctant to agree to ajoint sale of foreign and domes-
tic assets until an agreement has been reached on a division of the
proceeds.
Universalists attempting to put the best face on a bad situation
sometimes tout secondary bankruptcy as a way station on the road to
universalism. 19 6 In fact, however, the two systems do not mix well.
Universalism requires both cooperation from the non-home country
and a worldwide assertion of jurisdiction by the home country.
Although cooperation from non-home countries has been slow in
coming, a number of countries, including the United States, have en-
thusiastically asserted worldwide jurisdiction by imposing a worldwide
stay against the institution of foreign proceedings. 197 The bankruptcy
courts of these countries are powerless to punish foreign courts that
ignore their assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but they can
punish participants in the foreign proceedings who are unfortunate
enough to have to appear in both the home country and the foreign
proceedings. Thus, U.S. courts have held that persons violate an ex-
traterritorial U.S. automatic stay by commencing what amounts to a
secondary bankruptcy elsewhere. 19 8 This problem has a solution. In a
secondary bankruptcy world, no country should claim the right to stay
the institution of foreign proceedings except pursuant to treaty. But,
until the aggressively universalist nations back away from their claims
of worldwide jurisdiction, only outlaws can implement secondary
bankruptcies.
One also should note that secondary bankruptcy assumes some
means of determining the debtor's home country-where the foreign
bankruptcy court must send excess proceeds of a liquidation-but of-
fers no workable rule or standard for making that determination. Fi-
nally, like modified universalism, secondary bankruptcy is
incompatible with Westbrook's solution for determining which coun-
try's avoiding powers should be applied in multinational bankrupt-
cies. As discussed above, Westbrook's solution depends on a close link
between the choice of avoidance laws and of distributing courts.199
Such a link is impossible to maintain in a secondary bankruptcy sys-
tem, however, because secondary bankruptcies involve more than one
distributing court.
196 See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 43-44 (referring to a secondary bankruptcy system as
modified territorialism).
197 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
198 See cases cited supra note 145.
199 See Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 1, at 525.
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IV
RASMUSSEN'S CORPORATE-CHARTER CONTRACTUALISM
A. The System
In a recent article, Professor Robert K Rasmussen advocated a
system in which firms would be allowed to specify in their corporate
charters the country or countries that would administer their bank-
ruptcies. The courts of all countries would be bound to enforce those
provisions unless the results would be "'unreasonable and unjust."' 200
Under Rasmussen's proposal, the debtor not only could select a coun-
try or countries, but also could determine the system for cooperation
among them.20 ' Rasmussen would limit the debtor's choice only by
preventing the debtor from directing a country to apply another
country's bankruptcy law.20 2
To illustrate the operation of Rasmussen's "corporate-charter
contractualism," assume that the United States is the home country of
a debtor with substantial operations in Canada and Mexico. If the
debtor's charter provided that the firm's bankruptcy would be held in
Luxembourg, a country in which the debtor had negligible operations
or perhaps none at all and with which the debtor had no other rela-
tionship, the debtor would file for bankruptcy there.20 3 The Luxem-
bourg court would administer the assets of the debtor worldwide,
would determine whether to reorganize or liquidate the company
based on Luxembourg law, and would distribute the company's assets
based on priorities under Luxembourg law. The courts of other coun-
tries would be expected to render assistance to the Luxembourg court
unless the forum selection was "'unreasonable and unjust."' 20 4
B. Claimed Advantages
Rasmussen claims that his system provides a single, all-encompass-
ing advantage: it encourages the debtor to file in the country with the
most efficient bankruptcy law.20 5 This selection will maximize the
200 Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 32-35 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
201 Rasmussen is not entirely clear on this point. He specifically states that the debtor
can choose either a "country's or countries' insolvency laws" suggesting a possible choice of
territoriality. Id. at 32. He demonstrates that "one cannot identify which meta-rule-terri-
toriality or universalism-better maximizes social welfare," suggesting that his purpose is to
allow the parties to choose between them. Id.
202 See id. at 34.
203 While Rasmussen is not specific on this point, he appears to limit the choice of
bankruptcy law to the "laws of the various countries in which [the company] operates." Id.
at 35.
204 Id. at 35 (quoting Zapata, 407 U.S. at 15).
205 See id. at 20-21.
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value of the firm at its inception and will provide more value to dis-
tribute among its investors.
Rasmussen's system also would alleviate the problem of forum
shopping.20 6 His system would fix the country with bankruptcy juris-
diction at the time the company was incorporated and identify that
country on the public record. The company could make changes only
with the consent of all creditors, and any change would also appear on
the public record.20 7
C. Problems
Rasmussen's proposal for international bankruptcy is an applica-
tion of a more general idea he initially proposed,20 which is now pop-
ular among bankruptcy scholars who adhere to the law and economics
approach. 20 9 The idea, sometimes referred to as "contract bank-
ruptcy," is that the debtor and its creditors should select the applica-
ble bankruptcy regime by contract.210
The system Rasmussen proposes for international bankruptcy suf-
fers from the same two problems that render contract bankruptcy
problematic. First, the cost of contracting would be sufficiently high
to effectively exclude many interested parties from meaningful partici-
pation in the contracting process. Second, involuntary creditors do
not have the opportunity to contract. Either problem can lead to the
misallocation of resources.
1. Cost of Contracting
Rasmussen describes the assumptions underlying his proposal as
follows:
The possibility that a firm may encounter financial distress is known
to all who voluntarily deal with the firm. Lenders decide the terms
of loans based on the possibility of repayment. Bankruptcy rules
determine payouts when the firm encounters financial distress, and
thus form part of the calculus when lenders make lending
decisions. 211
206 Rasmussen himself makes no claim in this regard because he considers the prob-
lem of forum shopping insignificant. See id. at 10-12.
207 See Robert K Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71
TEx. L. REV. 51, 118 (1992) (noting that amendments to the corporate charter would be
permitted only "with the consent of all the creditors").
208 See id. at 53.
209 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807, 1810-11 (1998).
210 See Rasmussen, supra note 207, at 54 (arguing "that bankruptcy law should be
thought of in terms of the contract between a firm and its creditors").
211 Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 20.
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To take account of bankruptcy rules, however, each lender would
have to (1) obtain the debtor's corporate charter from the public rec-
ord, (2) analyze the possibly complex provisions of the charter gov-
erning bankruptcy, (3) determine the priority of the creditor's claim
under the law of the forum country or countries specified, and (4)
evaluate the "efficiency" of the country's bankruptcy system as it actu-
ally operates. The typical multinational firn probably has thousands
of creditors and shareholders, so these determinations must be made
thousands of times for every firm-including those firms that will never
file for bankruptcy. In practice, cost will preclude determinations by all
but the largest creditors.
Under such a system, some countries might be expected to mod-
ify their laws to compete for multinational bankruptcy cases. They will
appeal to those with the power to select their country as a forum-
debtors and their largest creditors. As a result, the countries most
likely to be chosen will not be those with the most efficient bankruptcy
laws, but those with the bankruptcy laws most favorable to debtors and
their largest creditors.212
2. Involuntary Creditors
Rasmussen recognizes that some creditors do not achieve their
status by contract and that their interests would not be protected in
the contracting process.2 13 The ultimate danger is the same as that
arising from the cost of contracting: the existence of would-be havens
with rules of priority and processes hostile to involuntary creditors.2 14
One easily can imagine tort-prone U.S. firms scouring the world for
jurisdictions in which personal injury verdicts are low, tort theories are
undeveloped, procedures are hostile to tort plaintiffs, or plaintiff's at-
torneys are unavailable. Indeed, some such firms might select forums
simply for their inconvenience to involuntary creditors. Given, for ex-
ample, the predilection for taxicab companies to organize a corporate
subsidiary for each cab to defeat tort liability, 215 one can expect them
to welcome the opportunity to select a country inconvenient to tort
plaintiffs as their bankruptcy forum.
212 Cf Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. Rxv. 1887, 1954-58
(1994) (critiquing the economic theory of secured financing for allowing "the modeler to
charge all participants in a market with knowledge that only some have").
213 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 34-35.
214 For a discussion of the harm that might follow, see LoPucki, supra note 212, at
1896-1902.
215 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 n.1 (Sup. Ct.
1995) (noting that "'what appears to be a rather common practice in the taxicab industry
of vesting the ownership of a taxi fleet in many corporations, each owning only one or two
cabs[,]' . .. remains a common practice in the taxicab industry to this day") (quoting
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966))), affd, 642 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1996).
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To address the problem, Rasmussen proposes that U.S. courts
"only enforce a forum-selection clause as applied to the involuntary
creditor, where the law of that court provides a priority at least...
equal to the priority that the creditor would receive in the U.S. court
and where that court provides an effective means to resolve the
claim."216 Under such a standard, each sizeable multinational bank-
ruptcy case might begin with hearings in every country where involun-
tary creditors were located to determine whether the forum selected
by the debtor was less favorable to the involuntary creditors than their
home forum, and if so, whether the forum selection was therefore
"'unreasonable and unjust."' 217  Presumably, Rasmussen's system
would tolerate some net disadvantage to tort creditors.218 A debtor's
optimal choice of forum might deviate from "efficiency" to the extent
of that disadvantage. 219
To make such an evaluation, the bankruptcy courts of the plain-
tiffs' countries would have to do exactly what Rasmussen seeks to have
them avoid-apply the bankruptcy laws of other countries.220 To illus-
trate the necessity for such an evaluation, consider the following ex-
ample. Plaintiff has filed suit for patent infringement against
Multifirm in country A. Multifirm files for bankruptcy in country B,
the country specified in its charter. Assuming the scheme most ame-
nable to Rasmussen's proposal, both countries give patent infringe-
ment claims priority as general creditors. As would usually be the
case, each country recognizes numerous types of claims, including se-
cured claims, as having priority over general creditors, but the lists are
not the same. Finally, the trustee might be able to avoid some security
interests and prepetition transfers under the laws of one of the coun-
tries but not the other. To determine whether application of the fo-
rum selection clause disadvantaged Plaintiff and therefore should be
denied enforcement, the bankruptcy court of country A might be
forced to calculate how country B would liquidate and distribute Mul-
tifirm's estate.
216 Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 35.
217 Id. (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
218 National priority schemes are sufficiently complex that virtually no two schemes
would treat tort creditors precisely the same way. Thus, as between any two systems of
priority, the selection by the debtor of one rather than another would impose some net
disadvantage on tort creditors. If a forum selection were considered "'unreasonable and
unjust,'" id., simply for imposing any net alisadvantage, Rasmussen's system routinely would
lead to multiple refusals of cooperation with home country proceedings.
219 That is, to capture the benefit associated with the disadvantage to involuntary credi-
tors, a debtor might select a forum that was not the most efficient.
220 See id. at 33 ("Bankruptcy rules are notoriously complex. It is fanciful to expect a
court to apply the bankruptcy law of a foreign country with anything approaching an ac-
ceptable degree of accuracy.").
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Rasmussen does not specify the consequences of a country's re-
fusal to enforce a forum selection clause. Presumably, the debtor's
bankruptcy would go forward in the forum selected by the debtor de-
spite nonenforcement by other countries. However, those nonenforc-
ing countries would not lend assistance or surrender assets to the
forum. To illustrate the kinds of inefficiencies that might result, con-
sider the example of a multinational company with high tort risk in
the United States and assets located throughout the world. By specify-
ing an antitort haven as its bankruptcy jurisdiction, the debtor could
give that country control of all its assets located outside the United
States. If the U.S. assets were insufficient to compensate the plain-
tiffs-perhaps because the U.S. assets were fully encumbered by se-
cured creditors or held in subsidiaries not reachable by the tort
creditors22 1-U.S. refusal to enforce the forum selection clause would
not benefit the tort creditor.
A country's reluctance to cooperate with foreign bankruptcy
courts in order to protect its domestic tort creditors could cause debt-
ors to select inefficient jurisdictions for reorganization. To illustrate
the possibility, assume that (1) Xis an integrated multinational com-
pany that would need all its assets worldwide to reorganize, 222 and (2)
countries tend to cooperate only to the extent legally required at the
time of bankruptcy.2 23 Xmight feel compelled to select as its prospec-
tive bankruptcy forum the country with the most stringent protections
of involuntary creditors, regardless of the efficiency of that country's
bankruptcy laws. Only that selection could assure the availability of all
the company's assets in the event reorganization became necessary. 22 4
This example illustrates the broader point that selection by the debtor
and its voluntary creditors of a particular forum would only prove that
their selection was an efficient response to the prevailing interna-
tional regime, not that the regime itself was efficient.
Finally, the possibility of nonenforcement as a remedy for domes-
tic tort creditors would threaten the universalist aspect of Rasmussen's
221 The former technique tends to be used by smaller companies, the latter by larger,
but they amount to the same thing. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YAL.
L.J. 1, 20-21 (1996) (explaining the parent-subsidiary strategy to avoid tort liability).
222 The assumption that such companies exist is a working premise of universalism. See
supra Part I.B.
223 Of course, countries that have not bound themselves in advance to cooperate in
the handling of multinational bankruptcies may choose to cooperate at the time of the
case. But in the cases where such cooperation actually occurs, both universalism and terri-
torialism will reorganize and liquidate companies equally well.
224 Based on these assumptions, cooperative territoriality would produce an even
worse result-reorganization would be impossible. The case for cooperative territoriality
rests upon different assumptions: (1) integrated multinationals that need their assets
worldwide to reorganize are relatively uncommon, and (2) in cases involving such multina-
tionals, cooperation at the time of bankruptcy would be highly likely.
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proposal. Nonenforcement in any country would thwart the world-
wide jurisdiction over the debtor's assets that universalism seeks to
promote.
V
COOPERATIVE TERRITORIALITY
"Territoriality," as the term is commonly used in the field of inter-
national bankruptcy, refers to a system in which each country adminis-
ters the assets within the country's own territory and recognizes other
countries' rights to do the same. But "territoriality" has developed
such bad connotations in the world of international bankruptcy that
the word is sometimes used loosely to refer to any failure to cooperate,
and it occasionally is used simply as a pejorative. 225 Perhaps as a re-
sult, courts and commentators generally attempt to portray their ac-
tions or proposals as some form of "universality."226
I use the word "territoriality" in describing the system I propose
because that is essentially what it is-a system in which each country
would administer the assets located within its own borders. The terri-
toriality I advocate is "cooperative" in two senses. First, even with the
country of administration settled, a variety of other matters remain
upon which countries will need to cooperate through treaty or con-
vention. Second, the proposed system is designed to serve as a foun-
dation for, and to encourage, mutually beneficial cooperation by the
representatives of particular bankruptcy estates.
A. The System
Under the cooperative territoriality system I propose, the bank-
ruptcy courts of a country will administer the assets of a multinational
debtor within the borders of that country as a separate estate.227 If a
debtor had significant assets in several countries, several independent
bankruptcy cases might result. None would be main, secondary, or
ancillary. Each of the courts would decide, according to local law and
practices, whether the assets within its country's borders would be re-
225 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note 13, at 534 (describing the system referred to
above as "secondary bankruptcy" as "modified universality, or qualified universality"). Sec-
ondary bankruptcy is probably best described as "modified territoriality" because it more
closely resembles territoriality than universalism, but only Westbrook has described it in
this manner. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 30.
227 Some assets are not located in any country. These assets would include ships and
aircraft while en route, oil drilling platforms on the high seas, and objects in orbit around
the earth. See, e.g., Underwood v. Hilliard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction over orbiting satellites because the debtor's "princi-
pal place of business" was in the United States). In accordance with the principle of sover-
eignty, the same government that has jurisdiction over the property for other purposes
should have bankruptcy jurisdiction over such property.
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organized or liquidated. If a court chose to liquidate the assets, it
would distribute the proceeds according to its own rules of priority.
To illustrate the worldwide operation of a cooperative territorial
bankruptcy system, assume again that the United States is the home
country of a debtor with worldwide operations. The debtor would file
bankruptcy in each of the countries in which it had operations. Each
of the filings would be of equal dignity. Each of the bankruptcy courts
would assume jurisdiction over the local assets, would determine
whether to cooperate in a multinational reorganization or liquidation,
and in the event of liquidation, each would distribute the assets of the
company among creditors and shareholders under local law.
The dearth of attention to territoriality in the literature has left
unanswered questions about how territoriality would work. In the
four subsections that follow, I suggest how a territorial system should
fix the location of assets, prioritize foreign creditors, choose applica-
ble law on avoiding powers, and order case-level cooperation.
1. Location of Assets
A cooperative-territoriality system would determine the location
of assets for bankruptcy purposes with reference to sovereign power.
The system would not deem assets "located" within a country unless
that country had de facto power over them. For example, an account
would be deemed located in a country only if the parties had suffi-
cient presence in the country that the country could enforce its deter-
minations regarding the account.
Often more than one country will have such power, necessitating
further agreement to fix a single location.228 Making de facto power a
prerequisite to jurisdiction, however, will reduce the number of con-
flicting claims over assets. Under the rule proposed here, a bank-
ruptcy estate in a country could include only property that the
government had the sovereign power to marshal without the assist-
ance of other nations.
Metaphysical difficulties in fixing a single location for intangible
assets cause many to scoff at the idea of permitting legal rights to de-
pend on the location of intangibles.229 But for reasons including reg-
228 For example, a country has such de facto power over any account allegedly owed by
a company that does sufficient business or has sufficient tangible property within its bor-
ders because the country can disrupt the business or seize the property if the company
does not pay the account. Marantz notes this kind of exercise of power in the context of
extraterritorial stays in bankruptcy. See Marantz, supra note 119, at 7 (noting that all but a
handful of lenders to Bramalea's U.S. entities also carried on business in Canada, render-
ing them vulnerable to the Canadian stay even for acts committed entirely within the
United States).
229 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 5(a) (1995) ("There is a considerable body of case law
dealing with the situs of choses in action such as these. This case law is in the highest
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ulation, taxation, and international relations generally, the
international community often has fixed locations for bank ac-
counts, 230 debts, franchises, leases, and every other kind of intangible
property. The arbitrariness of the locations thus fixed has not pre-
vented the international community from fixing them successfully.
Although the locations of these assets are mere conventions, they are
generally regarded as facts.23' Their extension to international bank-
ruptcy probably would go unopposed, if not unnoticed.
2. Treatment of Foreign Creditors
In the present system of international bankruptcy, discrimination
against foreign creditors is both permissible and common.23 2 Profes-
sor Westbrook advocates a change in the system to make bankruptcy
priorities "universal"-by which he means available "without regard to
nationality, residence, or other indicia of 'foreignness."' 23 3 Universal
priorities could exist within an otherwise territorial system. Assuming
that the countries involved were in agreement, a system in which juris-
diction over assets was entirely territorial could permit the filing of
claims by or on behalf of creditors anywhere in the world and could
entitle foreign creditors to the priorities available to similarly situated
domestic creditors. Such entitlements would, however, be
undesirable.
Discrimination against foreign creditors, like other discrimina-
tion, can be de jure or de facto. De jure discriminations-laws that
expressly single out foreigners for disadvantageous treatment-are ap-
degree confused, contradictory and uncertain: it affords no base on which to build a statu-
tory rule."); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 42 ("[Slitus rules are notoriously difficult and
arbitrary in application."). But see id at 40-43 (defending the use of the situs-of-collateral
rule in an international system based on modified territorialism).
230 For example, despite the surreal nature of the problem of determining the country
location of a bank account owing from a bank that does business in two countries to a
debtor who does business in both countries, the circuit court in Maxwell had no difficulty
in solving it. The banks apparently denominated each account, not only by currency, but
also by country of "location," either the United States or United Kingdom. See Maxwell
Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.), 93 F.3d
1036, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the transactions with reference to the countries
involved). See generally Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account7, 57 MD. L. REv. 1
(1998) (explaining the location of bank accounts).
231 See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 230, at 3-4, 24-27.
232 See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 29 ("[Tlhe conventional assumption is that foreign
creditors would not be given the benefit of priorities under local law."). For examples of
priorities given locals, see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (5) (B) (1994) (creating a priority under U.S.
law available only to "persons [sic] ... engaged as a United States fisherman"); Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Discrimination in Foreign Bankruptcy Laws Against Non-Domestic Claims, 47 Am.
BANu. LJ. 147, 150 (1973) (noting that Argentine law gives priority to claims payable in
Argentina).
233 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 38 (advocating such "cross-priority" under territorial-
ism); see also Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 29 ("Few, if any, argue that foreign creditors
should be treated differently from domestic creditors based solely on their nationality.").
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parently rare,23 4 but de facto discriminations-those ostensibly based
on some factor other than foreignness but which have the effect of
preferring local creditors-are more common and of far greater eco-
nomic significance.235
An example of de facto discrimination would be Bankruptcy
Code § 545,236 which by negative implication gives priority to a vast
array of state-created statutory liens, including construction liens, arti-
san's liens, agricultural liens, hospital liens, attorney's charging liens,
garage keeper's liens, and employee's liens for unpaid wages.2 37 Each
234 An example of this type of discrimination is 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (5) (B), which cre-
ates a priority for "United States fishermen." Experts in the local systems have almost uni-
formly reported, however, that the claims of foreigners were recognized on an equal
footing with the claims of nationals. See, e.g., Dianna P. Kempe, Insolvency in Bermuda, in
Multinational Commercial Insolvency at A-i, C-12 (Daniel M. Glosband & E. Bruce Leo-
nard eds., 1993); Ralph D. McRae & Liza Kessler, Multinational Commercial Insolvency in
Canada, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at E-33; Jonathan E.F.
Rushworth, Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency in England, in MULTINATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL INSOLvENC, supra, at 1-32; Laurent Gaillot, Foreign and Multinational Business Insol-
vency-France in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at J-35; Paul H. Bars,
Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency in Israel in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INsOL-
VENCY, supra, at 1-27; Agustin Berdeja-Prieto, Debt Collateralization and Business Insolvency: A
Review of the Mexican Legal System, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENC, supra, at 0-
22; Jan Schjatvet, Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency in Norway, in MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at Q-23-24; James G. Birrell, Foreign and Multinational Busi-
ness Insolvency-Scotland, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra at S45-46; Odd
Swarting, Principal Features of Swedish Insolvency Law, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSoL-
VENCY, supra, at U-20; Robin Phelan, Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency in the
United States, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at W-18; Carlos J.
Sarmiento-Sosa, Arrears and Bankruptcy Under Venezuela's Commercial Code, in MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at X-11; Makoto Ito, Report for Japan, in CRoss-BoRDEa IN-
SOLVENCY. NATIONAL AND COMPARATV STUDIES 178, 181 (Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1992). Only a
few exceptions have been reported. Argentina discriminates on the basis of whether the
claim was payable in Argentina or abroad. See Guillermo E. Matta y Trejo, Insolvency Legisla-
tion in Argentina, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at A-22 ("[I]f the credi-
tor filing his claim is connected with a bankruptcy adjudicated in a foreign country,
Argentine legislation confines said creditor, allowing him to collect once every creditor
whose credits are payable in Argentina have collected."). The Australian expert reported
discrimination against foreign creditors with "claims of a penal or revenue nature." See
John Stumbles, Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency in Australia, in MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at B-49. The German expert reported "no fiscal claim of a
foreign public authority is privileged." Hans-Jochem Luer & Hans-GerdJauch, Foreign and
Multinational Business Insolvency in Germany, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY,
sUpra, at K-11. The Netherlands expert reported that "[a] claim having preference or pri-
ority under foreign law may only be recognized as a general pan passu claim." Ronald De
Ruuk, Foreign and Multinational Business Insolvency-The Netherlands, in MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra, at P-12.
235 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by
Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1977) ("[F]or reasons which are sometimes
clear and sometimes obscure, local creditors often obtain more than an equal share from
the local assets.").
236 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1994).
237 See LYNN M. LoPucfa & ELzABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
738-45, 751 (2d ed. 1998) (describing the variety of statutory liens).
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of these liens, by its nature, arises only in favor of persons providing
goods or services within the jurisdiction that authorized the lien. A
Martinique national can obtain a statutory lien under Missouri law by
furnishing labor or materials for the construction of a building in Mis-
souri. In the vast majority of cases, however, the building for which a
Martinique national furnishes labor or materials will be in Martinique.
Priorities under the Missouri lien law go primarily to U.S. nationals.
One cannot answer the charge of discrimination by saying that
the Martinique national who furnishes labor or materials to the same
debtor for construction of a building in Martinique can have priority
in that building under the Martinique lien law. Each country giving
its own nationals priority in property within its own borders is the very
evil Westbrook sought to address with his "universal priorities. '238
Professor Westbrook realizes that statutory liens are so woven into
the fabric of bankruptcy jurisprudence that they cannot be removed
merely to facilitate a system of international bankruptcy. He does not
propose that his principle of antidiscrimination reach statutory
liens.23 9 By limiting his proposal in this manner, however, he assures
its ineffectiveness. Nations will remain free to grant de facto priorities
to their own nationals with respect to any type of claim simply by
designating the priority as a "lien."240 "Universal priorities" would be
universal in form, but not in substance.
The adoption of such a superficial antidiscrimination regime
would do little good. It could do much harm by upsetting the internal
balance of national systems of priority. For example, the Mexican sys-
tem gives wage claims priority over most kinds of secured claims, en-
suring that Mexican workers receive full payment in most cases.
Unless Mexico responded to Westbrook's proposed system by grant-
ing those employed in Mexican facilities a statutory lien for wage
claims in place of their priority for wage claims, universal priorities
would disappoint the expectations of Mexican workers by diluting the
priority of their claims. For the American workers employed by the
Mexican firm, who in all likelihood knew nothing of Mexican bank-
ruptcy priority until their employer filed bankruptcy, their priority in
the Mexican bankruptcy probably would come as a windfall.
238 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 28.
239 See id. at 36 (using a Martinique supplier of rivets for a building located in the
United States as an example of such a lien).
240 Many statutory liens are limited to specific property improved by the lienor and for
the amount of the improvement, but many others are not. See, e.g., CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc.
§ 1205 (West 1997) (giving unpaid wages of employees earned within 90 days prior to the
sale or transfer of a business priority in the proceeds of the transfer). Instead of granting
employees a bankruptcy priority, countries that wished to discriminate could grant them a
statutory lien against the debtor's means of production. Instead of granting a bankruptcy
priority to those advancing expenses of administration, the country could grant them a
statutory lien against the estate.
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Scholars working from an economic perspective often assume
that expectations will change to meet whatever rules -are in place. 24'
On that basis, one might conclude that the Mexican employees
should not have expected to have the Mexican wage priority to them-
selves, but should instead have discounted their own claims for the
foreign dilution. As I have explained at length elsewhere, however,
such market "learning" is imperfect, and the effect of adopting a
nonintuitive rule is often to extract a perpetual subsidy from the per-
sons in the position here occupied by the Mexican workers. 242 In this
instance, at least, the better course would be to craft law that gives
effect to existing expectations.
The "national treatment" that Professor Westbrook advocates also
might upset the legitimate expectations of defendants in personal in-
jury cases. For example, assume that a bankrupt firm manufactured a
product that inflicted injuries on both Americans and foreigners. The
debtor proposes a reorganization plan that would pay fixed amounts
of money for specified injuries. Under the plan, the amounts to be
paid to foreigners are only thirty-five percent to sixty percent of the
amounts to be paid to Americans. The debtor justifies this treatment
by pointing out that each claimant will be receiving the amount that
the courts of their respective countries would grant in nonbankruptcy
litigation.243 Westbrook's proposal of national treatment in U.S.
bankruptcy presumably would bar the confirmation of such a plan.
Yet confirmation may be appropriate on the ground that the result
will be consistent with the remainder of the international system for
241 See LoPucki, supra note 212, at 1954-56. Other scholars sometimes make the same
assumption. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 36-37 (seeming to assume that the Mexican
landlord of a U.S. company would anticipate application of the rent cap in U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code § 502(b) (6)). But see Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual
Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Piority, 75 TEx. L. REv. 11, 32-42 (1996)
(demonstrating empirically that the assumption does iot reflect the reality of construction
contracting).
242 See LoPucki, supra note 212, at 1956-58 (illustrating the limits on market learning).
243 This example is not entirely fanciful. Thousands of foreigners injured by breast
implants filed claims against Dow Coming. The debtor proposed a plan that in many
instances would pay fixed amounts for scheduled injuries. In recognition of the lower
values of the foreign plaintiffs' claims in the courts of their home countries, Dow Coming
proposed to pay 35% to 60% of the scheduled amounts to foreign claimants. See Debtor's
Response to Tort Committee's Motion to Modify Exclusivity To Permit Filing of Tort Com-
mittee Plan at 10, In re Dow Coming Corp., 1995 WL 495978 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995)
(No. 95-20512) (noting that "[t]he Amended Plan offers improved treatment of foreign
tort claims, increasing the range of payment to between 35%-60% of payments for domes-
tic tort claims"). In other words, foreign women will receive less for precisely the same
injuries. A personal injury claim is "foreign" under the plan if it "(a) is held by a Person
who, at the time the Claim arose, was residing or domiciled outside the Greater U.S., or
(b) arises from a medical procedure performed outside the Greater U.S." Second
Amended Plan of Reorganization of Dow Coming Corporation 1.54, In re Dow Coming
Corp. (No. 95-20512).
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compensating personal injury.244 The point is not that such a plan
necessarily should be confirmed, but merely that confirmation of such
a plan would be a legitimate exercise of sovereignty that should not be
constrained wholesale by international law.
Little evidence exists that discrimination against foreign lenders
is a problem.245 Market forces are the probable explanation. Foreign
lenders are unlikely to lend to debtors in jurisdictions that do not
afford those lenders a recovery in bankruptcy. The indirect benefits
to a country from the availability of foreign lending likely outweigh
the direct benefits from discriminating against foreign lenders in
bankruptcy cases. Part V.C.4 below discusses discrimination against
foreign involuntary creditors, a problem more likely to occur.
Once one recognizes the chimerical nature of "equality of distri-
bution" in the international context,246 it becomes apparent that no
principle ofjustice requires adjustment of the recoveries of creditors
in one territorial proceeding for the amounts they recover in another.
The courts only need to follow the priority law of each jurisdiction
with respect to the assets within the jurisdiction and to prevent credi-
tors from recovering more than the entire debts owed to them. The
resulting distribution will be a composite of the priority laws of the
countries involved, weighted by the proportion of assets in each.
3. Avoiding Powers
As previously noted, Professor Westbrook has proposed an ele-
gant solution to the otherwise perplexing problem of which country's
avoiding statutes to apply.247 His solution is to apply the avoiding
powers of the country whose estate would be augmented by avoid-
ance.248 One can adapt his solution to a territorial regime by making
one simple adjustment: treat international movements of debtor's as-
sets as if they were transfers to a separate entity in the destination
country. The rationale for such treatment is that, in cases reaching
bankruptcy under a territorial regime, the effect of the debtor moving
property to another country would be the same as the effect of the
244 If the case arose after foreign courts entered judgments in favor of the foreign
claimants, the U.S. court should confirm the plan. The only alternative would be to sec-
ond-guess foreign courts in all personal injury cases. To allow the foreign creditor's recov-
ery to vary depending on whether a judgment had been entered would generate
unproductive strategic activity. See LoPucki, supra note 20, at 491-96 (noting that particu-
lar results are sometimes necessary to the functioning of a law-related system). I do not
mean to assert that only one outcome is reasonable in this hypothetical, but only that
"national treatment" may not be appropriate in this, or similar instances.
245 See sources cited supra note 234.
246 See WooD, supra note 59, § 1-14, at 10 ("In practice even the most cursory examina-
tion of bankruptcy internationally shows that the pari passu rule is nowhere honoured.").
247 See text accompanying supra note 182.
248 See text accompanying supra note 182.
[Vol. 84:696
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
debtor transfering property to another entity. The movement would
place the asset in the debtor's estate in the destination country. That
estate would be another entity.
The facts of Maxwell illustrate how Westbrook's solution can be
modified to work under a territorial regime. Maxwell, a British com-
pany, owned subsidiaries in the United States.249 Needing funds to
repay its debts to British and French banks, Maxwell sold two of the
U.S. subsidiaries.2 50 The proceeds were paid to Maxwell in the United
States, and Maxwell deposited the funds in its U.S. bank accounts.
Maxwell then transferred the funds to its British bank accounts, from
which it paid the money it owed the banks.251 If U.S. law applied to
these payments, the trustee could have avoided them as preferences.
However, the U.S. court held that British law applied,252 and under
British law, the trustee could not, as a practical matter at least, avoid
the payments. 253
Assuming that the assets sold were located in the United States at
the time of the sale, the rules I propose would reach a different result.
U.S. law would govern the transfer of funds from Maxwell's U.S. ac-
count to its British account. This transfer would be constructively
fraudulent because Maxwell's U.S. estate would not have received rea-
sonably equivalent value. However, British law would govern the
avoidance of the payments made to creditors from Maxwell's British
assets because recovery of the payments would augment the British
estate. That is, absent avoidance the preferential payments would de-
plete Maxwell's British estate and ultimately reduce the recovery of
Maxwell's creditors claiming against that estate. British law deliber-
ately approved the payment to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy-
American law did not. British claimants should have borne the loss. 2 5 4
Implementing this rule would necessitate treaties that require the
return of fleeing assets, but negotiating these treaties should not be
difficult. Every country would be vulnerable to eve-of-bankruptcy re-
moval of assets that would threaten distributions to local creditors.
No country could hope to profit systematically by establishing itself as
a destination for these transfers because the source countries and the
creditors within them would anticipate and prevent the transfers.2 55
249 See Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Communica-
tion Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
250 See i&
251 See id. at 1040-41.
252 See id. at 1051.
253 See id. at 1043 (stating that the intent requirement for preference avoidance under
English law "apparently would be a significant or insurmountable obstacle for the adminis-
trators were they to litigate the preferences question in London under English law").
254 In Maxwel, both the U.S. and British creditors bore the loss together because the
distribution from the single depleted estate was presumably pro rata. See id. at 1042.
255 See infra Part V.C.3.
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4. Cooperation
Cooperative territoriality, as this Article has described it, elimi-
nates the tension between countries by vesting each with bankruptcy
power congruent with its sovereignty. No nation need recognize for-
eign authority over domestic assets or sacrifice the interests of local
debtors or creditors in particular cases. The elimination of that uni-
versalist tension provides the foundation for cooperation among
courts and representatives that will be mutually beneficial in each
case. Among the kinds of cooperation contemplated are the follow-
ing: (1) the establishment of procedures for replicating claims filed in
any one country in all of them;256 (2) the sharing of distribution lists
by representatives to ensure that later distributions do not go to credi-
tors who have already recovered the full amounts owed to them; (3)
the joint sale of assets, when ajoint sale would produce a higher price
than separate sales in multiple countries or when the value of assets
within a country is not sufficiently large to warrant separate adminis-
tration; (4) the voluntary investment by representatives in one country
in the debtor's reorganization effort in another; and (5) the seizure
and return of assets that have been the subject of avoidable transfers.
A cooperative territorial system and a universalist one will differ
less in practice than in theory. When multinational companies oper-
ate in foreign countries through local subsidiaries, when each subsidi-
ary owns assets in only a single country, and when the courts recognize
the subsidiaries as separate entities, territoriality and universalism
yield the same results. Each entity's assets are administered separately
in the country where that entity has both its assets and its home, and
that country's law governs. One can think of cooperative territoriality
as a simplification of universalism in which multinationals conclusively
are presumed to do what they usually do-incorporate separately in
each country.257 A regime of cooperative territoriality would rein-
force the already strong tendency for multinational corporations to
keep their operations in various countries separate. 258 Separate incor-
poration would eliminate in most cases the troublesome aspects of
cooperative territoriality, such as the mass filing of claims in multiple
jurisdictions.
256 For example, if the prerequisites of a priority wage claim differed from one jurisdic-
tion to another, the representatives might devise and distribute a form that would be effec-
tive in all jurisdictions.
257 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
258 But see Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 31 (asserting the existence of a "trend... toward
more integrated transnational operations").
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B. Advantages
As discussed above, 259 universalism would not work in a world in
which businesses are comprised of corporate groups. The two main
rationales for universalism-facilitating worldwide reorganization and
worldwide sale of assets-require that the home country exercise juris-
diction over the entire group in at least some cases. Such "group"
jurisdiction would broaden bankruptcy jurisdiction beyond acceptable
limits. 2 60 In most cases, the home country's jurisdiction over the en-
tity's assets would suffice to capture the benefits of universalism. But
permitting the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether ju-
risdiction should extend to the group or merely to the entity would
sacrifice predictability.
Cooperative territoriality solves the corporate group problem by
severing the firm at the national border. Severance is unlikely to do
much damage because the large majority of multinationals already
compartmentalize themselves by country. A regime of cooperative
territoriality would provide multinationals with an even greater incen-
tive to compartmentalize by country, thereby further reducing the
damage.
Cooperative territoriality offers greater predictability to lenders
than universalism. Lenders know which entities are indebted to them.
In a cooperative territorial regime, the only additional information
lenders would need to predict their treatment in bankruptcy would be
the countries in which their debtors' assets were located and the distri-
butional priorities of those countries. Although the international
movement of assets could alter the calculation,261 lenders could pro-
tect themselves in most instances by controlling those movements. 262
In place of universalism's complex domestic interface,263 cooper-
ative territoriality offers transactional simplicity. Domestic law would
govern wholly domestic transactions. Parties who dealt domestically
would litigate in domestic bankruptcies regardless of the debtor's na-
259 See supra Part I.C.
260 See supra Part I.C.3.
261 See, e.g., Trautman et al., supra note 5, at 604. Trautman, Westbrook, and Gaillard
predict that the administration of moveables under situs law
will produce lots of pre-bankruptcy shenanigans and an occasional absurd-
ity, like the application of French law to a shipment of Spanish goods to
Hamburg, where the truck full of goods was on the outskirts of Paris when
the insolvency proceeding was initiated. For intangibles, like bank ac-
counts, the electromagnetic maneuvering will be even more elaborate and
the decisions even more arbitrary and unpredictable.
Id. To a French creditor who seized the goods on the outskirts of Paris before the bank-
ruptcy case was commenced elsewhere, the application of foreign law that universalism
requires would be the absurdity.
262 See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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tionality. Employees and trade creditors would have the same re-
course to their debtors' assets whether those debtors resolved their
financial problems in or out of bankruptcy. Foreign creditors con-
cerned about their status as foreigners could domesticate themselves
by incorporating local subsidiaries to lend within the country.
Universalism requires the bankruptcy courts of those countries
with actual control of assets to surrender that control by exporting the
assets. They are expected to do so in the faith that other courts will
do the same with sufficient frequency to produce what Westbrook
calls a "Rough Wash. ' 264 Not surprisingly, some courts have been re-
luctant to surrender control,265 engendering further suspicions on all
sides.266 By yielding bankruptcy power over an asset to the country
that in fact has power over that asset, a territorialist regime would min-
imize the tensions between cooperating countries. As the interna-
tional bankruptcy system currently operates, aggressively universalist
countries continuously risk international confrontation by their uni-
lateral claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction. By contrast, cooperative
territoriality validates no claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction and re-
quires no wholesale surrender of sovereign power.
Territoriality also comports with the prevailing regime of admi-
ralty law. Admiralty law is strictly territorial.267 That is, a country's law
only governs when a ship or aircraft is in that country.268 The admi-
ralty system generates relatively few conflicts because admiralty law is
relatively uniform throughout the world, and admiralty judgments re-
ceive international recognition. 269 If the international insolvency re-
gime is also territorial, the same country's law will govern the ship or
aircraft-whether the matter is dealt with in admiralty or bank-
ruptcy-and the international harmony achieved by admiralty law will
264 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 464-65.
265 See Knecht, supra note 3, at 314 (stating that "in several cases the U.S. courts have
found that a transfer of the assets would violate the interests of the U.S. claimholders").
266 See In re Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l, SA, 4 All E.R. 796 (Q.B. 1996) (ap-
plying English set-off rules before remitting funds to Luxembourg, despite Luxembourg
court's claim to entire funds); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 480-81
(noting suspicions regarding reciprocity that contributed to lack of international coopera-
tion in the reorganization of U.S. Lines in Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. U.S. Lines, Ltd., 2
Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1987)).
267 See William Tetey, Q.C., Conflicts of Law Between the Bankruptcy Courts in Admiralty:
Canada, United Kingdom, United States, and France, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 259-60 (1996)
("The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime
Liens and Mortgages, May 27, 1967 (1967 Convention), at Article 2, assigns 'all matters
relating to the procedure of enforcement' to the 'law of the State where enforcement takes
place.'" (citations omitted) (quoting International Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, May 27, 1967, art. 2, reprinted in THE
RATIFICATION OF MARrrIME CONV'rrlONS Item No. 4.20, at 1.4-4 to -6 (Institute of Maritime
Law, Univ. of Southhampton, England ed., 1990).
268 See Alwang, supra note 11, at 2628-29.
269 See id. at 2628.
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continue. If the international insolvency regime is universal, conflicts
will arise between admiralty law and bankruptcy law whenever the ship
or aircraft is in a country other than the debtor-owner's home coun-
try. These conflicts will render the universalist system less predictable
to lenders, delay the enforcement of admiralty liens, increase the ex-
pense of the insolvency, and add to the uncertainty of
reorganization. 270
Perhaps the greatest advantage of cooperative territoriality is that
implementation would require only minimal changes in current prac-
tices. Despite their protestations to the contrary, most countries have
in most cases acted territorially with regard to assets within the coun-
try at the time of the bankruptcy filing. To achieve worldwide cooper-
ation under territoriality, aggressively universalist countries such as
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom need only to
drop their claims of worldwide jurisdiction and to adopt domestic laws
authorizing narrow forms of cooperation directly benefiting their own
citizens. 271
C. Problems
The principal weaknesses of cooperative territoriality would be
(1) the possible need for creditors to file and prosecute claims in all
jurisdictions in which bankruptcy proceedings were pending against
their debtors, (2) the need for cooperation among courts and repre-
sentatives to effect a multinational liquidation or reorganization, (3)
the possibility of strategic removal of assets from the country on the
eve of bankruptcy, and (4) the need for protection of involuntary
creditors. Despite the seriousness of these problems, cooperative ter-
ritoriality remains the best of the five systems discussed in this Article.
1. Multiple Filing and Prosecution of Claims
The system for establishing claims in bankruptcy cases works es-
sentially as follows. Upon filing the case, the debtor furnishes a list of
all creditors and the amounts owed to each.272 In liquidation cases,
the system distrusts the debtor's list because an insolvent debtor has
no interest in the funds being disbursed. 273 Apparently, the fear is
that debtors will list bogus claims so that distributions will be made to
persons who are not bona fide creditors. To prevent bogus claims,
270 See id. at 2635-42.
271 See Gaa, supra note 13, at 897 (noting that nations are more likely to agree on
narrow issues than on a universal bankruptcy regime).
272 See EPSIN Er A.., supra note 73, §7-3, at 455.
273 In a reorganization under U.S. law, even an insolvent debtor ordinarily has an in-
terest in the funds being disbursed; perhaps for that reason the law does not require proofs
for debts listed by the debtor as undisputed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994).
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each creditor is required to file a "proof' of its claim.2 74 Usually a
statement of the circumstances giving rise to the debt is sufficient as a
proof of claim, but in any particular jurisdiction, the system may im-
pose formal requirements. 275 Once the claim is filed, the estate's rep-
resentative and the creditors have the opportunity to object to it.2 7 6 If
someone does object, the court summarily decides the dispute.
Under cooperative territoriality, a creditor could reach all of its
debtor's assets only by filing claims in each country where the debtor
had assets. Two problems would arise with regard to the establish-
ment of those claims. First, the creditors, who for a large multina-
tional debtor often number in the thousands, might each have to
grapple with local procedures, in each country where the debtor has
assets, regarding the proof of their claims. Second, the parties may
have to litigate a disputed claim in each of the proceedings in which
the creditor has filed that claim.
The first problem is essentially clerical. Although filing a proof
of claim is in most countries a simple matter that does not require the
assistance of an attorney, in some countries it may be more difficult.
Individual creditors are unlikely to master procedures for filing for-
eign claims without assistance. The obvious source for that assistance
would be either the local court or the representative of the local es-
tate.2 77 In large cases, computers could be used to automate the pro-
cess. Over time, countries may agree to exchange lists of locally filed
claims, deem them filed in each court, and allow those to which no
one lodges an objection. 278
Clumsy as multiple filing of proofs of claim may be, a territorial
system with multiple filing of claims may work more smoothly than
the single filing system of universalism. In that single filing system, no
local court may be available to assist creditors in filing in the home
country. Each creditor would have to cross the barrier of legal cul-
ture-and perhaps also language-alone. 279
274 See id.
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 In other words, the creditor would make a local filing, and the court or representa-
tive would assist the creditor in replicating the filing in each jurisdiction in which the
debtor is in bankruptcy.
278 The European Union Convention has adopted a system in which "[e ] ach liquidator
in an insolvency proceeding in an EU country may file claims on behalf of all the creditors
in that proceeding in each other EU-member proceeding involving the same debtor."
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 30. Westbrook refers to such a system as "universal cross-fil-
ing." Id.
279 See SiGMAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 107 (discussing Principle 2(G), which provides
that foreign creditors must file claims in the local forum, in local language, and abide by
the formalities of local law).
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The second problem is potentially more serious. Assume, as a
worst-case scenario, a mass-tort bankruptcy in which hundreds of
thousands of individuals make claims against the debtor for personal
injury. In the asbestos and breast implant cases, for example, the ne-
cessity to reduce so many claims to a specific dollar amount over-
whelmed the U.S. federal court system.280 Because of its greater
flexibility to promote settdement, the bankruptcy system is better
suited to the task, but even the bankruptcy system may be challenged
by some mass torts. For instance, if a multinational company that is a
defendant in mass tort cases were to file bankruptcy in several coun-
tries, the case management problem would be multiplied. Each claim
potentially might have to be relitigated in each country.
Probably the best solution to this problem is the one set forth in
the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat.28s Local claimants would re-
quest that the foreign bankruptcy courts permit their claims to be liq-
uidated in the local bankruptcy court.28 2 One trial would be held for
each claim, and the result would bind all of the bankruptcy courts. 28 3
The foreign court could refuse to permit local liquidation of claims,
but the pressure on the foreign court to allow the requests-the possi-
bility that the foreign court would have to try all of the cases again if it
did not allow them-would be enormous. Another possible resolu-
tion would be for the claimant to liquidate its claim in the local bank-
ruptcy court and then seek recognition of the judgment in the other
bankruptcy courts under the rule of comity.
At first glance, universalism appears to offer a better solution to
the problem of resolving disputed claims. In a universalist system, the
bankruptcy court of the home country would resolve disputed claims.
Only one resolution of each claim would be necessary. On closer ex-
amination, however, this seemingly elegant solution proves facile. It
assumes that nations will do in bankruptcy what they consistently have
been unwilling to do in other contexts-grant judgments of foreign
courts the equivalent of full faith and credit.2 8 4 Universalism essen-
280 See, e.g., MichaelJ. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Bene-
fits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. Rxv. 815, 816-17 (1992)
(describing the extent of the problem created by the asbestos litigation).
281 See SIGAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 107-08 (Principle 2(I)).
282 See id.
283 Personal injury claims may have sharply different values in different countries. See
supra note 243 and accompanying text. If local courts determine the value of each claim,
and those values serve as the basis for a pro rata distribution, claimants from countries
where personal injury claims have high values will recover more than claimants from other
countries. The problem is difficult, but it is neither caused by nor unique to territoriality.
284" See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895) (refusing comity to a French
judgment and stating that "[i]f we should hold this judgment to be conclusive, we should
allow it an effect to which, supposing the defendants' offers to be sustained by actual proof,
it would, in the absence of a special treaty, be entitled in hardly any other country in
Christendom, except the country in which it was rendered."). But see RussellJ. Weintraub,
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tially would require as much because the non-forum country must
surrender assets to satisfy claims adjudicated solely by the forum
country.285
2. Cooperation Needed for Reorganization or Liquidation
In a universalist system, the bankruptcy court of the home coun-
try could sell the assets of the company in a single, worldwide package
if that would bring the best price. The bankruptcy courts of other
countries would be obligated to assist. In a territorial system, achieving
the same result would require voluntary cooperation from those other
countries. Westbrook doubts that such cooperation would be forth-
coming. By way of explanation, he posits an example in which X
company
had an integrated manufacturing, distribution and marketing sys-
tem in several countries, divided into divisions by product type. The
assets are evenly distributed in X the U.S., and the U.K., but the
asset/local-debt ratio is greatest in the U.S., so that U.S. creditors
would do better in a local distribution at any given level of return
from sale of assets or businesses. Sale of assets will bring US$33
million in each country. Sale of the divisions across national lines as
going concerns will bring $200 million worldwide, in part because
of trademarks that have much greater value on a worldwide basis.286
Westbrook concludes that
[i]f the local asset/local-debt ratio is sufficiently skewed to the U.S.,
it will be in the interest of U.S. creditors to press for local distribu-
tion despite the lower returns on piecemeal sale of assets. If the
grab rule [territoriality] were applied in the U.S., the U.S. courts
would favor that local interest.28 7
First, note that Westbrook's example assumes that the U.S. court
would not permit foreign creditors to file claims in the U.S. proceed-
ing.2 88 Such a refusal represents a possible form that territoriality
might take, but not a likely one.28 9 Westbrook also assumes that the
U.S. creditors must suffer delay or risk their $33 million expectancy to
participate in the worldwide attempt to get $200 million.2 90 That is
generally, but not invariably, true. Finally, Westbrook supposes that
How Substantial Is Our Need for aJudgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain
Away To Get It?, 24 BRoov-J. INT'L L. 167, 178-80 (1998) (pointing out that some countries
have begun to recognize foreign judgments).
285 See infra Part V.C.4.
286 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 465.
287 Id.
288 If foreign creditors could file claims in all countries and share on the same basis as
local creditors, all creditors would have identical incentives.
289 See supra Part V.A.2.
290 If the U.S. creditors did not suffer risk or delay, the U.S. creditors would want the
U.S. estate to join in the worldwide sale simply because they would gain from it.
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the U.S. court would decide whether to join in the worldwide sale
based solely on the interests of local creditors.
Even under these restrictive assumptions, the non-U.S. creditors
should have no difficulty enticing the U.S. creditors to participate in a
worldwide sale if the payoffjustifies the risk. They could compensate
the U.S. creditors for the added risk by granting them a priority for
their $33 million expectancy or, if necessary, by paying them a
premium.
In a bankruptcy case, no creditor may recover more than the full
amount owing to it. For that reason, the U.S. creditors would lack
incentives to cooperate in the rare case in which the U.S. creditors
were already certain of a 100% recovery from the U.S. assets. Bank-
ruptcy law bars the deal that would maximize wealth-the trustee's
surrender of the U.S. assets to the U.S. creditors who then join in the
sale in return for a greater than 100% recovery-because bankruptcy
distributions traditionally can be made only in cash, not in prop-
erty.29 ' But the bankruptcy system has anticipated the problem. The
trustee, not the U.S. creditors, decides whether to join in the sale.
The trustee represents not the unsecured creditors, but just all parties
with an interest in the U.S. estate. Here, the trustee must protect the
debtor's interest in the residual of the estate. 292 Under U.S. law, the
trustee in the 100% recovery hypothetical should risk the U.S. credi-
tors' expectancy by joining in the worldwide sale because that course
maximizes the estate.293 Like the current system, a territorial system
would obligate the U.S. representative to impose risk on the U.S. cred-
itors to benefit the debtor, and the representative probably would
comply. Thus, Westbrook's assumption that in a territorial system the
U.S. courts would refuse to join in the sale is doubtful.
The delays involved in commencing a proceeding in each coun-
try, obtaining the appointment of a representative in each, and con-
tracting among those representatives may prevent some
reorganizations or advantageous liquidations. But this problem is not
unique to territoriality. In fact, the problem is likely to be more se-
vere under the most commonly considered types of universalism. In
those types, the representative of the estate appointed in the main
proceeding must file ancillary proceedings in each of the countries
involved and must win a surrender of the assets before the reorganiza-
tion or liquidation could go forward. 294
291 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1994) (imposing on the trustee the duty to "collect
and reduce to money the property of the estate").
292 See id. §726(a)(6).
293 See, e.g., In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the duty of a trustee is "to maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group
of claimants").
294 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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3. Strategic Removal of Assets from the Country Before Bankruptcy
The problem of strategic removal of assets on the eve of bank-
ruptcy would be more severe under territoriality than universalism. 2 95
As noted above, the problem would necessitate treaties to insure the
return of fleeing assets to the country in which they were located dur-
ing the relevant period preceding the bankruptcy filing.29 6 Unless
such returns were routinely made, debtors and their favored creditors
would have the incentive to remove assets, and such removals might
become common.
However, the problem of strategic removal probably would not
be great. Large creditors could contract for nonremoval and enforce
the contract by monitoring the debtor and filing a bankruptcy before
the threatened removal occurs. Local law could criminalize the most
egregious removals. For example, U.S. creditors commonly contract
with their debtors to prevent the removal of collateral,297 and some
U.S. jurisdictions criminalize removals that violate security agree-
ments.298 Arrangements such as "blocked accounts" could prevent in-
ternational movements of cash. 299
Most countries will share a common interest in the repatriation of
fleeing assets. Their creditors will be beneficiaries in some cases, but
they will be victims in others. Countries will experience more pres-
sure to prevent the expectancy losses from outgoing transfers than to
seek the windfalls from incoming transfers.
Some countries might benefit systematically from fleeing assets
and therefore be reluctant to enter into treaties requiring their re-
turn. They might, for example, be havens that cater to debtors and
their dominant creditors by permitting use of the fleeing assets in
295 The problem would continue to exist in a universalist regime with regard to assets
removed from the home country. The home country court theoretically would control
those assets but after removal would need the cooperation of the transferee-country's court
to exercise that control.
296 See supra text accompanying note 255.
297 See, e.g., LoPucvi & WARREN, supra note 237, at 300-01 (reprinting a security agree-
ment according to which a debtor is in default for keeping collateral at any location other
than that specified in the agreement); 14 BRADFORD STONE, WEST's LEGAL FORMS 703 (2d
ed. 1985) (providing that "debtor will not remove the collateral from the State without the
written consent of the secured party").
298 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 185.05 (McKinney 1988) (criminalizing the "withhold-
ing" of collateral by a person who has no right of sale or other disposition under the
security agreement); Wis. STAT. ANN. §943.25(2) (West 1996) (making concealment of per-
sonal property in which one knows that another has a security interest a felony).
299 In a "blocked account arrangement," a line of credit, rather than funds on deposit,
serves as the debtor's working capital. All revenues are deposited to the "account" as pay-
ments on the line loan. The debtor can draw on the line only by specifying an amount and
a payee. See, e.g., LoPuciu & WARREN, supra note 237, at 260-62 (discussing lines of credit).
In such an arrangement, the debtor could make an international transfer of funds only by
persuading the bank to write the check.
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worldwide reorganization efforts. They also may be countries where
few assets are located but whose laws give priority to local creditors.300
However, these problems are not unique to cooperative territoriality.
Potential havens would have the same incentives to refuse coopera-
tion in a universalist system.
4. Protection of Involuntary Creditors
As noted above, market forces would tend to protect foreign
lenders, but not foreign involuntary creditors, against discrimination
in a territorial system.301 In a territorial system, countries might
choose to protect foreign involuntary creditors either because they
agree with the foreign policies that led to the judgments or because
they seek reciprocity with regard to their own policies. But for such
reciprocity to come about, the countries granting the judgments real-
istically would have to negotiate for it.
Countries should be involved in these negotiations. Every claim
of an involuntary creditor is the direct product of some country's so-
cial policy. In other words, the claim exists because the country au-
thorized the involuntary creditor to bring the action and perhaps also
adjudicated it. To require a second country to recognize that claim
exports the social policy of the first.
When the two countries follow similar policies and procedures,
the recognition of foreign claims has produced few problems. But
often the policies or procedures differ. One country would award
child support in an amount much greater than another; one country
would recognize a particular cause of action, but another would not;
one country sharply limits verdicts for personal injury while another
gives juries full rein.
Territoriality offers no easy solution to this problem, but neither
does universalism. The idea that countries will surrender control of
domestic policies over such issues as family law, products liability, la-
bor relations, or intellectual property rights simply because the
debtor's "home country" is elsewhere represents wishful thinking on
the part of universalists. Territoriality recognizes that the problem re-
quires specific adjustment between countries rather than moralizing
about international cooperation.
300 While such a country might not be inclined to return fleeing assets, one has diffi-
culty imagining why assets would flee to it.
301 See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
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CONCLUSION
Territoriality provides the soundest basis for international coop-
eration in multinational bankruptcy. Three advantages of territorial-
ity over universalism dominate the comparison.
First, territoriality permits the local country to effectuate its rules
of priority to the maximum extent of its sovereignty. By contrast, uni-
versalism requires that countries sacrifice not only their sovereignty,
but also particular creditors' priority rights in deference to priorities
granted by the home country to others. This distinction between the
two systems is important because priorities differ significantly from
country to country, and most extenders of credit likely will contract in
anticipation of local priorities, even in a universalist system.30 2
Second, territorial distributions offer greater predictability than
universalist distributions. The territorial distribution depends on the
location of assets at the time of the bankruptcy filing. In nearly all
instances, the country in which an asset is located will be easy to deter-
mine. Creditors can control the country in which an asset is located at
bankruptcy by contracting for a particular location and monitoring
the indicia of location. To supplement that control, countries can
deal with eve-of-bankruptcy strategic removals by negotiating treaties
providing for return of transferred assets.
By contrast, universalist distributions depend on the home coun-
try of the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy filing. The home coun-
try of truly multinational companies defies easy identification because
of the lack of international consensus on two issues. The first is
whether the home country is determined for a corporate group, a par-
ticular entity, or an "integrated" business. The second is whether the
home country of an entity is the country of incorporation, headquar-
ters, or operations. Courts too easily manipulate vague standards such
as the "center of its interests" or the "center of gravity" when the fu-
ture of local businesses, the priorities of local creditors, and millions
of dollars in professional fees hang in the balance. Debtors could al-
ter their centers of gravity on the eve of bankruptcy, and local courts
could yield to national self-interest by ruling opportunistically.
Finally, even if one could identify the bankrupt's home country
with precision at the time of bankruptcy, complexity would still crip-
ple the predictability of a universalist system. To fix the terms of
credit, any extender must begin with an understanding of its rights on
default. To reach that understanding in a universalist system, the ex-
tender must know the home country of its borrower and the country's
302 Major lenders such as banks and insurance companies probably will contract in
anticipation of whatever priorities the law in fact enforces. But they are far outnumbered
by minor lenders, trade creditors, employees, and others for whom the expense of discrim-
inating among debtors on the basis of nationality would be prohibitive.
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system of priorities-not merely as law on the books, but as it operates
in practice.303 Determining these things at the time of the loan would
prove impractical in most cases. The problem would afflict not just
banks engaged in international lending, but every extender of credit
in every nation-from the Mexican employee of a U.S. company in
Mexico to the U.S. supplier of a piece of equipment to a Canadian
firm. Globalization and its attendant increase in international exten-
sions of credit will only exacerbate the problem.
The principal weaknesses of territoriality-the necessity for each
creditor to file a claim in each country and perhaps to relitigate the
claim in each-can be overcome. The first problem is essentially cler-
ical-replicating claims filed in one country to others. Computeriza-
tion makes technological solutions to clerical problems easy to
imagine. The second problem, the possible necessity for relitigation
of claims in multiple fora, persistently troubles international law. This
problem results partly from fear that other nations might abuse the
system by exaggerating local claims if their judgments were entitled to
the equivalent of full faith and credit. It also results partly from fear
that enforcement will abrogate the enforcing country's social policies
in favor of the foreign country's. The traditional solution is comity-
the recognition of foreign judgments when the local forum deter-
mines that they are neither abusive nor contrary to the policies of the
forum. Comity is the likely solution in a territorial international bank-
ruptcy system as well. The universalist "solution" to this problem re-
quires the foreign country to surrender all the assets to the home
country and then permits the home country to resolve both foreign
and domestic claims. This solution effectively would allow the policies
of the debtors' home countries to prevail worldwide. As a result, it is
not truly a solution, but one of the many reasons why countries have
been unwilling to accede to universalism.
The globalization of business and the resulting increase in the
frequency and importance of multinational corporate bankruptcy in
the past decade have highlighted the previously obscure problem of
multinational bankruptcy. With a procession of high visibility cases as
their laboratory, scholars of international bankruptcy have made great
303 For example, the law on the books in the United States would postpone the pay-
ment of wages owing to employees at the time a bankruptcy reorganization case is filed
until the effective date of the plan. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v.
Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (barring distributions to prepetition unsecured
creditors on a piecemeal basis prior to the approval of a plan). Nevertheless, courts com-
monly have authorized payment in the ordinary course of business in first-day orders, ulti-
mately leading to an "emergency doctrine" to justify them. See, e.g., Michigan Bureau of
Workers' Disability Compensation v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R
279, 285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding early payment of worker's compensation ben-
efits under the doctrine of necessity).
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strides in understanding the intricate problems of choice of law and
choice of forum. As I hope I have demonstrated in this Article, how-
ever, the universalist paradigm in which those scholars have been
working has impeded progress at the systems level. Countries must
cooperate if they are to solve the problems of international bank-
ruptcy, but universalism has no monopoly on cooperation. Because
territoriality gives greater recognition to sovereignty, it limits the need
for international cooperation to the kinds of issues with which cooper-
ation has been most successful in the past-those that do not redis-
tribute entitlements. The time has come to recognize that
universalism is the problem, not the solution, and to put universalism
behind us.
